



Race and Retribution: An Empirical 
Study of Implicit Bias and 
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Retribution stands at the forefront of America’s criminal justice system. 
Yet, as Justice Anthony Kennedy cautioned, retribution is also the motive 
for punishment that “most often can contradict the law’s own ends.” This 
Article proposes, and then tests empirically, the existence of a novel 
contradiction of retribution — the idea that race and retribution have 
become automatically and inextricably intertwined in the minds of 
Americans.  
The study we present in this Article demonstrates that the core support 
for retribution’s use has been shaken by implicit racial bias. Our national 
empirical study, conducted with over 500 jury-eligible citizens, shows that 
race cannot be separated from the concept of retribution itself. The study 
finds, for example, that Americans automatically associate the concepts of 
payback and retribution with Black and the concepts of mercy and leniency 
with White. Furthermore, the study showed that the level of a person’s 
retribution-race implicit bias predicted how much they supported 
retribution as a desirable punishment rationale — the stronger the anti-
Black implicit racial bias they held, the more likely they were to harbor 
retributivist views of criminal punishment.  
Contextualized within the racial history of America’s criminal justice 
system, as well as the continued racial disparities in the criminal justice 
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system, the results of our empirical study have wide-ranging implications 
for legislative enactments, constitutional challenges to harsh punishment 
practices, and even for the reduction of excessive force against civilians in 
the context of policing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When it comes to justifications for punishment, retribution is first 
among equals.1 Its prominence in legal codes and constitutions traces 
back thousands of years,2 and it counts among its supporters some of 
the world’s finest philosophers, legal scholars, and judges.3 It is not 
 
 1 See Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining 
Punishment, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 437 (2006) (finding that in a study 
of punishment motivations, retribution information was more relevant to punishment 
than either deterrence or incapacitation information, people prefer retribution 
information when punishing others, and that retribution information increases people’s 
confidence in assigned punishments); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 
(2008) (“[C]apital punishment is excessive when it . . . does not fulfill the two distinct 
social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital 
crimes.”); Robert Bohm, Retribution and Capital Punishment: Toward a Better 
Understanding of Death Penalty Opinion, 20 J. CRIM. JUST. 227, 227 (1992) (noting that 
“retribution appears to be the primary basis of support for the death penalty in the 
United States”); Chad Flanders, Can Retributivism Be Saved?, 2014 BYU L. REV. 309, 309 
(2014) (“Retributive theory has long held pride of place among theories of criminal 
punishment in both philosophy and in law.”).  
 2 See, e.g., CODE OF HAMMURABI §§ 196, 200 (L. W. King trans., Yale L. Sch. Avalon 
Project 2008) (c. 1754 B.C.E.), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/hamframe.asp 
(asserting the principles of “[a]n eye for an eye” and “[a] tooth for a tooth”). Indeed, 
retribution’s logic is central to the Old Testament. See Exodus 21:23-25 (New American 
Standard) (“But if there is any further injury, then you shall appoint as a penalty life for 
life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for 
wound, bruise for bruise.”).  
 3 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(“The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct 
in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the 
stability of a society governed by law.”); H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of 
Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 7 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that 
“punishment is justified as an ‘emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime’”); 
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 253 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge 
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retribution in theory, however, but rather retribution as it plays out in 
the real world, that has proven problematic.4 In this Article, we focus 
on one particular problem of historical significance that takes on new 
meaning in the context of modern social science — the seemingly 
endless connection between race and retributive demand, and its 
manifestations in America’s modern criminal justice system. In doing 
so, we build on social cognition literature, and propose that despite the 
sound reliance on retribution as a legitimate theoretical pillar of 
punishment theory, retribution in practice no longer exists without 
implicit racial bias.  
To test the hypothesis that Americans now implicitly associate — on 
an automatic cognitive level — the concepts of race and retribution, we 
conducted a national empirical study with over 500 jury eligible citizen 
participants. By implementing study methodologies from the field of 
implicit social cognition, we were able to test — and our results 
demonstrate — that race has become inextricably tied to the concept of 
retribution itself. In other words, retribution itself has become an 
automatically racialized justification for punishment.  
Now is a perfect time to reignite a conversation about the role of 
retribution in criminal law. America has finally begun to reckon with 
the aftermath of thirty years of mass incarceration, and scholars 
continue to work to untangle the complex webs that created its rise in 
the first place.5 Through this work, one lesson has become increasingly 
 
Univ. Press 1991) (1785) (“Every deed that violates a man’s right deserves punishment, 
the function of which is to avenge a crime on the one who committed it (not merely to 
make good the harm that was done).”). Yet, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 
majority in Kennedy, cautioned that retribution is also the motive for punishment that 
“most often can contradict the law’s own ends” by “risk[ing] its own sudden descent 
into brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and restraint.” 
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420. This caution is important to heed.  
 4 Our goal in this Article is to address retribution as an expression of punitiveness 
or payback, and specifically how it plays out in the world of criminal justice. There is 
important and robust scholarly literature explicating the various strands of 
retributivism, but it is not our aim in this Article to participate in that dialogue. We 
hope that others will build upon the study we conducted, and wrestle with its deeper 
theoretical implications for retributivism. Our choice to operationalize retribution in a 
way that connects to the public understanding of it, however, allows us to grapple with 
how most lawmakers, judges, and jurors negotiate the impulse for “paying back” those 
who are understood to have violated important cultural norms. 
 5 See, e.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF 
MASS INCARCERATION 3 (2019); EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW MOVEMENT TO 
TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION (1st ed. 2019); AMY 
E. LERMAN & VESLA M. WEAVER, ARRESTING CITIZENSHIP: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES 
OF AMERICAN CRIME CONTROL (2014) (discussing the carceral state in America and 
custodial citizens). 
  
2019] Race and Retribution 843 
clear: moral panics, most of them racialized and driven by retributive 
discourse, contributed mightily to the punishment excesses of the past 
few decades.6 These moral panics saw pundits and professors alike 
warning at one time, for example, of a “new breed” of merciless juvenile 
“superpredators” and the horrors of “crack babies.”7 Because of the tight 
connection between moral panics and criminal sentencing, hundreds of 
thousands of Americans are spending decades — or even their whole 
lives — in prison based on baseless legislative assumptions. Retributive 
demand propelled these policies to fruition in the minds of largely well-
meaning American citizens and leaders. But what if American citizens 
and leaders cannot think about punishment without incorporating 
automatic racial bias?  
Outside of the focus on retribution in sentencing policy in the context 
of moral panics, modern discussions of race and retributive excess also 
have seen a connection between racialized policing and excessive use of 
force.8 Our study serves as a new vehicle to understand how even pre-
arrest policing practices may automatically be bringing racialized 
retributive excess to communities across America. Thus, the racialized 
impact of a retribution-race bias begins with lawmaking, continues with 
policing practices, and crescendos in sentencing policy.  
This Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we set the stage for our 
argument by highlighting the entrenched importance of retribution to 
the criminal justice system.9 We focus both on death penalty 
 
 6 See, e.g., SHAY BILCHIK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 1999 NATIONAL REPORT SERIES: CHALLENGING THE MYTHS 
(Feb. 2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178993.pdf (describing the 
debunked superpredator theory, which predicted in the 1990s a large wave of 
remorseless and violent juvenile offenders); see also STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND 
MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF THE MODS AND ROCKERS xvii-xviii (3d ed. 2002) (1972).  
 7 See, e.g., Editorial, Echoes of the Superpredator, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/echoes-of-the-superpredator.html 
[https://perma.cc/LNB4-GGN7] [hereinafter Echoes of the Superpredator] (describing 
the superpredator panic); see also Stacey Burling, The Littlest Victims of Cocaine, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Aug. 24, 1989), http://articles.philly.com/1989-08-24/news/26150896_1_ 
babies-foster-care-supervisor-cocaine; Charles Krauthammer, Worse than ‘Brave New 
World’: Newborns Permanently Damaged By Cocaine, PHILA. INQUIRER (Aug. 1, 1989), 
http://articles.philly.com/1989-08-01/news/26148256_1_cocaine-babies-crack-babies-
damage [https://perma.cc/MSV7-FK8L]. 
 8 See, e.g., Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After Michael Brown — Toward an End 
to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 37-38 (2015) (“[W]here 
police killings occur in circumstances where there is no possible harm to the officer or 
imminent threat to the public, the implicit question is always whether the prevention 
of imminent threat rationale is sound or is in effect one sounding in ‘just desserts’ or 
retribution in exchange for ‘being’ a suspect.”). 
 9 See infra Part I.  
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jurisprudence, where the United States Supreme Court largely has 
rested the constitutionality of the death penalty itself on retribution’s 
shoulders, as well as on commentary and cultural positioning that 
underscores retribution’s importance more generally within the 
criminal justice system. In a realist context that explores the practical 
effects of retribution in America, we further examine how retributive 
urges have led to moral panics, which in turn have led Congress and 
state legislatures to enact regressive laws.  
In Part II, we present a social science theory behind our proposal that 
race and retribution have become cognitively inseparable.10 Specifically, 
we argue that race and retribution have become cognitively intertwined 
for two reasons: first, because of the deep and troubling historical 
connection between the two concepts, and second, because citizens’ 
psychological understanding of retributive punishment already rests 
upon the racialized psychological building blocks of fear, anger, and of 
empathy. In this context, we explain how the cultural context of 
retribution has created a new type of implicit bias: a race-retribution bias.  
In Part III, we turn from the theoretical basis of our proposal to an 
empirical exploration of our hypothesis, using methods from the field 
of implicit social cognition on a national sample of over 500 
Americans.11 We presented participants with an Implicit Association 
Test — a measure that uses reaction times in milliseconds to test 
people’s associations between concepts — and measured the ways in 
which they associated race (White or Black) with concepts of 
retribution or mercy. The study found that participants more strongly 
associated Black faces with the concepts of retribution, payback, and 
revenge, and White faces with the concepts of rehabilitation, treatment, 
and redemption. Moreover, the degree to which people associated Black 
more closely with retribution-inspired words than with mercy-inspired 
words predicted the degree of overall retributive punishment 
philosophies that the participants embraced. In other words, our study 
found that race is now psychologically engrained — at least in Black 
and White — into the very concept of retribution. 
In Part IV, we consider these results’ ramifications for criminal law 
and theory.12 First, our study exposes grave, and arguably fatal, cracks 
in the only remaining justification for the constitutionality of the death 
penalty. In addition to the findings that race and retribution are 
inextricably intertwined in members of the American public, we found 
 
 10 See infra Part II.  
 11 See infra Part III.  
 12 See infra Part IV. 
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that these racialized retribution effects are even exacerbated by the 
process of “death qualification,”13 raising the probability that processes 
designed to protect the fairness of death penalty administration actually 
themselves trigger racial bias in its administration.14 In the lawmaking 
context, our results have important implications regarding how moral 
panics such as the mythical superpredator and crack-baby scares fuel 
race-tinged retributive excess that result in harsher sentencing laws. 
Finally, in the policing context, though not retribution in a formalistic 
sense, the racialized “payback” impulse we found could help explain 
the excessive use of force by police upon civilians — including the 
shootings of unarmed Black citizens. Our findings thus have 
 
 13 “[D]eath [Q]ualification” describes the process during voir dire whereby 
potential jurors are typically questioned about their willingness to impose the death 
penalty in certain (e.g., “the worst of the worst”) murders. Patrick Radden Keefe, The 
Worst of the Worst, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2015/09/14/the-worst-of-the-worst [https://perma.cc/VK8T-59RV]. Jurors who would 
be unwilling to find a defendant guilty (if they knew that death were a possible 
punishment should they convict), would be unwilling to ever impose the death penalty, 
or who always would vote for death as a sentence in any murder, are frequently removed 
from the jury pool. See id. 
 14 Prior research on death qualification established “conviction proneness” — the 
idea that death qualified jurors would be more likely to convict than jurors who are 
excluded under Witherspoon. For analysis of these conviction proneness findings, see, 
for example, Edward J. Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases 
Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from California, 3 WOODROW 
WILSON J.L. 11, 32 (1981) (reporting study findings of “conviction proneness” in 
multiple California locations, and concluding that Witherspoon excludables are 
“consistently and substantially less conviction prone than those retained on the panel”); 
Edward J. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-
Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1 (1970) 
(finding that “[t]the more favorably [a venireman] views capital punishment, the more 
conviction prone he tends to be”); Claudia L. Cowan et al., Effects of Death Qualification 
on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 53, 53 (1984) (studying whether death-qualified jurors “are more likely to 
convict a defendant than are people who are excluded from serving on capital juries”); 
Robert Fitzgerald & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death 
Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 46-48 (1984) (noting that “a 
person’s attitude toward capital punishment is an important factor . . . about crime 
control and due process”); Craig Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing 
Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121, 121 (1984) 
(“Subjects who were exposed to death qualification were significantly more conviction 
prone.”); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a “Death Qualified” Jury on the Guilt 
Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567, 567 (1971) (reporting data of a study 
showing that death qualification “makes for conviction-prone jury”); William C. 
Thompson et al., Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation of 
Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95, 109 (1984) (“These two studies help 
explain the consistent finding that death-qualified jurors are more likely to convict a 
criminal defendant than excludables.”). 
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implications not only for criminal law jurisprudence, but also for 
sentencing policy and policing reform. 
I. RETRIBUTION AND THE LAW 
There may be no more important criminal law theory than 
retribution. This Part defines retribution, establishes its centrality to 
criminal law, and explores the massive impact it has in sentencing and 
even lawmaking.  
A. Retribution and Its Central Role in Criminal Law 
Retribution is at the core of America’s criminal law theory, legislation 
and doctrine. This legal significance of retribution dates back in history 
to at least the Old Testament command — “an eye for an eye, a tooth 
for a tooth”15 — a principle that the Hammurabi Code, the earliest 
surviving code of law, adopted.16 Retribution holds that punishment 
should be in proportion to the severity of the offense, the culpability of 
the offender, or both. As the Supreme Court has explained, retribution 
“reflects society’s and the victim’s interests in seeing that the offender is 
repaid for the hurt he caused.”17  
Philosophers, most notably Immanuel Kant, have long recognized 
retribution as a moral underpinning of punishment.18 So, too, have 
renowned legal thinkers such as Herbert Wechsler, who posited that 
retribution in criminal law, “whatever its exponents may avow as its 
philosophy and purposes, is actually animated largely by retributive 
 
 15 See Exodus, supra note 2, at 21:23-25 (New American Standard) (“But if there is 
any further injury, then you shall appoint as a penalty life for life, eye for eye, tooth for 
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.”) 
(emphasis added). But see Romans 12:19 (New American Standard) (“Never take your 
own revenge, beloved, but leave room for the wrath of God, for it is written, 
‘VENGEANCE IS MINE; I WILL REPAY,’ says the Lord.”). 
 16 See CODE OF HAMMURABI, supra note 2, §§ 196, 200. 
 17 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 442 (2008). 
 18 See, e.g., KANT, supra note 3, at 253 (“Every deed that violates a man’s right 
deserves punishment, the function of which is to avenge a crime on the one who 
committed it (not merely to make good the harm that was done).”); see also MICHAEL S. 
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 91 (2010) (“For a 
retributivist, the moral responsibility of an offender also gives society the duty to punish. 
Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory of justice such that, if it is true, we have 
an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.”); John Rawls, Two 
Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955) (noting that according to the retributive 
view, “punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment”). 
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objectives, constituting nothing more than vengeance in disguise.”19 
Herbert Packer summarized the foundational psychological importance 
of retribution by noting that “[t]he retributive view rests on the idea 
that it is right for the wicked to be punished.”20  
Retributivism’s pride of place extends beyond the theoretical and into 
the center of criminal law practice. The American Law Institute’s Model 
Penal Code also “adopts desert as the primary distributive principle for 
criminal liability and punishment.”21 State legislatures, including in 
California, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Washington have identified 
retribution as the primary or sole purpose of punishment.22 Judges, too, 
often focus on retribution as the cornerstone for justifying the sentences 
they impose. For instance, in sentencing Bernie Madoff, a 71-year-old 
man, to 150 years in prison — a de facto death sentence — Judge Denny 
Chin said, “an offender should be punished in proportion to his 
blameworthiness,” and, since Madoff’s acts were “extraordinarily evil,” 
Chin chose the extraordinarily harsh sentence to send a message that 
Madoff would “get what he deserves.”23 
 
 19 See Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 
1103 (1952) (noting evidence that “penal law, whatever its exponents may avow as its 
philosophy and purposes, is actually animated largely by retributive objectives, 
constituting nothing more than vengeance in disguise”); see also HERBERT L. PACKER, 
THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37 (1968) (“The retributive view rests on the idea 
that it is right for the wicked to be punished: because man is responsible for his actions, 
he ought to receive his just deserts.”).  
 20 PACKER, supra note 19, at 37 (“[B]ecause man is responsible for his actions, he 
ought to receive his just deserts.”). Scholars have also used empirical methods rooted 
in psychology to prove that Americans rely heavily on retribution in their punishment 
justifications. See, e.g., Carlsmith, supra note 1, at 437 (finding that in a study of 
punishment motivations, retribution information was more relevant to punishment 
than either deterrence or incapacitation information, people prefer retribution 
information when punishing others, and that retribution information increases people’s 
confidence in assigned punishments); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility 
of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468-71 (1997) (reporting findings from a series of 
studies that show that laypersons prize desert over other purposes of punishment). But 
see Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 77, 77 (2013) (reporting on a series of studies that illustrate that other 
considerations, such as incapacitation, matter, too). 
 21 Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility of 
Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1940 (2010) [hereinafter The Disutility of Injustice]. 
 22 See Paul H. Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in the Competition Between 
Deontological and Empirical Desert, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831, 1831 n.1 (2007). 
 23 Benjamin Weiser, Judge Explains 150-Year Sentence for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES (June 
28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-recounts-
his-thoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/4FVE-APSQ]. 
Many other judges have discussed retributivism and its ties to revenge. See, e.g., Baze v. 
Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79-80 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“We are left, then, with 
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Retribution plays a pivotal role not only in criminal theory and 
practice, but also in defining the constitutional limits of the ability of 
legislatures to enact punishment. The Eighth Amendment’s bar on 
excessive punishment demands that criminal sanctions “embrace and 
express respect for the dignity of the person” by ensuring the severity 
of the sanction aligns with the culpability of the person who committed 
it.24 Therefore, in gauging the constitutionality of a punishment 
practice, the Supreme Court has asked whether the challenged sanction 
“measurably contributes” to the retributive purpose of the 
punishment.25 For example, the Court has said that executing juveniles 
or the intellectually disabled is retributively extravagant.26  
The Supreme Court used the same retribution-based rationale in 
Graham v. Florida to bar life without parole for juveniles who commit 
non-homicide offenses.27 In this context, the Court has elevated the idea 
that retribution in terms of moral culpability is not only a backwards 
looking idea. The Graham Court, underscoring that few, if any, 
juveniles possess an “irretrievably depraved character,”28 focused on the 
idea that children change, often profoundly so. The Court stated that, 
“[b]y denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the 
State makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place 
in society. This judgment is not appropriate in light of a juvenile non-
 
retribution as the primary rationale for imposing the death penalty . . . . A natural 
response to such heinous crimes is a thirst for vengeance.”); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 
137, 180-81 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Retribution, which has as its core logic 
the crude proportionality of ‘an eye for an eye,’ has been regarded as a constitutionally 
valid basis for punishment only when the punishment is consistent with . . . the 
defendant’s culpability, and when ‘the administration of criminal justice’ works to 
‘channel’ society’s ‘instinct for retribution.’”); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“But I cannot see that this [punishment] is anything other 
than forcing retribution from the offender — naked vengeance.”). 
 24 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008). 
 25 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20 (2002) (holding that executing people 
with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments, but states can define who has an intellectual disability). For further 
examination of Atkins, see Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: 
Implications of Atkins for Executing and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 
463-64 (2003). 
 26 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“Whether viewed as an attempt 
to express the community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the 
wrong to the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an 
adult. Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one 
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason 
of youth and immaturity.”); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318. 
 27 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 28 Id. at 68. 
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homicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral 
culpability.”29 Thus, in additional to crime-specific calculations of 
desert, the Court’s categorical exemption cases focus on both the 
culpability of the transgressor at the time of the offense and the 
possibility that she or he experiences redemption over time.  
The constitutionality of the death penalty swings, in large part, on the 
belief that executions meaningfully contribute to a retributive 
justification for the punishment.30 In other words, if life without parole 
satisfied the societal demand for retribution, the capital punishment 
could not survive constitutional scrutiny. This reliance on retribution 
as a justification for punishment “is of particular concern” in the death 
penalty context, wrote Justice Anthony Kennedy, because retribution is 
the rationale that “most often can contradict the law’s own ends” and 
“[w]hen the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into 
brutality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and 
restraint.”31 As Professor Justin Levinson and colleagues have 
explained, “the relationship between race and retribution is important 
because retribution has been cast as an indispensable component to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, while racial arbitrariness is an 
impermissible consideration for imposing capital punishment. Yet, it 
might be that one cannot be contemplated without also considering the 
corresponding impact of the other.”32  
In the legal context, the age-old importance of retribution to the law 
may be paralleled loosely by the importance of retribution to human 
evolution. Some scholars, for example, suggest that retribution is 
something of a biological imperative, and therefore operates — like 
implicit bias — on an automatic level. Professor Joshua Greene, a 
psychologist, writes: “as an evolutionary matter of fact, we have a taste 
for retribution . . . .”33 Professor Thane Rosenbaum wrote: “Despite the 
stigma of vengeance, it’s as natural to the human species as love and 
 
 29 Id. at 74. 
 30 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 79 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that 
“[t]he legitimacy of deterrence as an acceptable justification for the death penalty is also 
questionable, at best” and “[w]e are left, then, with retribution as the primary rationale 
for imposing the death penalty”). 
 31 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008). 
 32 Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit Racial 
Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 541 
(2014) [hereinafter Devaluing Death].  
 33 Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 35, 71 
(Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). 
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sex.”34 In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Potter Stewart underscored the 
instinctual and heightened role of retribution in capital punishment, 
articulating a similar view: “The instinct for retribution is part of the 
nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration of 
criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability 
of a society governed by law.”35 This approach views retribution not as 
a calculated and rational process, but rather an automatic one that relies 
on highly emotional cues. Much like implicit bias, then, it functions 
faster than a deliberate balancing, and serves as a short cut that allows 
people to save cognitive resources. 
Retribution’s role, then, in American criminal law, embraces both its 
vast importance to legal doctrine — such as the judicial reliance that 
upholds the death penalty, as well as its central role in understanding 
how Americans’ retributive urges shape reactionary lawmaking on a 
federal and state level. If retribution had stayed its moral course, and 
never racialized, then perhaps a descriptive model of it its role in the 
criminal justice system wouldn’t reveal discrimination on a potentially 
epic scale. Yet, the reality of retribution’s role in American criminal 
justice reveals not only racialization, but also a potential corruption of 
retribution’s very legitimacy. 
II. HOW THE RACE-RETRIBUTION ASSOCIATION HAS BECOME 
AUTOMATIC IN AMERICANS’ MINDS 
The racialization of retribution in American criminal justice has 
occurred for complementary reasons. This Part explores the “why” 
behind our hypothesis that race and retribution have become 
cognitively intertwined and formed a new retributive implicit racial 
bias. We propose two complementary arguments that converge at the 
intersection of race and retribution, both leading to the creation of the 
new implicit bias. First, we propose that American historical 
 
 34 Thane Rosenbaum, Opinion, Justice? Vengeance? You Need Both, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/28/opinion/28rosenbaum.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/Z5ZP-JYTM] (concluding that the government has a “moral duty to 
satisfy the needs of victims to feel avenged”). 
 35 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COMMON LAW 41-42 (Dover 1991) (1881) (“If people would 
gratify the passion of revenge outside of the law, if the law did not help them, the law 
has no choice but to satisfy the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private 
retribution.”); Antonin Scalia, God’s Justice and Ours, FIRST THINGS (May 2002), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2002/05/gods-justice-and-ours [https://perma.cc/CA3L-
9WWG] (noting “the authority of a government to exact vengeance” and the fact that 
punishment can be “deserved” and “just”). 
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associations between race and retribution have created a part of 
American culture whereby the two concepts have become cognitively 
conflated. And second, we argue that three core psychological elements 
underlying the retributive calculation — fear, anger, and empathy — 
have each become intertwined with implicit racial bias. We thus provide 
historical and structural social science-based support for our claim that 
retribution, in reality, no longer exists without race.  
We begin by describing briefly some highlights of the cognitive 
science underlying implicit bias. 36 For several decades, psychologists 
have used a variety of methods to measure and reveal the way the 
human mind works automatically to influence perceptions, decisions, 
and even actions.37 This automatic cognitive influence related to 
meaningful group membership — called implicit bias — has been 
studied and documented in a variety of domains across the legal 
 
 36 We have defined implicit bias as “the automatic attitudes and stereotypes that 
appear in individuals.” Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 32, at 518. 
 37 See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE 
OF REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 123 (Henry L. Roediger 
III et al. eds., 2001) (exploring the theories underlying the measurement of automatic 
cognitive associations); Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers 
and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006 (2007) 
(empirically measuring response times in decisions to shoot, focusing on police 
officers); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to 
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1314, 1322 (2002) (introducing the “shooter bias” task, which measures response time 
in simulated shooting decisions); Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their 
Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 9 (1989) 
(employing “priming” to measure the effects of automatically activated stereotypes on 
ambiguous behaviors); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual 
Processing, J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876 (2004) (empirically exploring the 
automatic connection between White and Black faces with various race-based 
stereotypes); Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation 
and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509 (1991) 
(measuring how exposure to a White or Asian research assistant activated stereotypes 
in word completion tasks); Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social 
Cognition: Attitudes, Self-esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4 (1995) (setting 
forth theoretical support for the idea that attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes all rely 
on “implicit modes of operation”); Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, 
Discrimination and the Implicit Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 
359 (2007) (finding that implicit associations predicted both self-reported 
discriminatory actions as well as economic decision-making). 
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system,38 especially in criminal law.39 These studies have shown 
repeatedly that negatively stereotyped groups, particularly African 
Americans, may be punished by implicit bias at almost every stage of 
the criminal justice system, both in a theoretical and practical way.40 
 
 38 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 
1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477 (2007) (“They have pointed to an expanding mass of 
evidence from experimental psychology that appears to demonstrate the pervasiveness 
of unconscious bias based on race, gender, and other legally protected characteristics, 
evidence that raises troubling questions about the effects of such bias on legally relevant 
behaviors.”); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1535-39 (2005) 
(introducing implicit bias research to legal scholars generally, and applying it to the 
communications law and policy context); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (introducing the concept of unconscious 
discrimination to the employment discrimination realm); Linda Hamilton Krieger & 
Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and 
Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1026-27 (2006) (“[A]ntidiscrimination 
jurisprudence has in many respects proven stubbornly refractory to the conceptual 
adjustments the science of implicit bias suggests it needs.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, 
The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 317, 322-23 (1987) (drawing primarily upon Freudian psychology, and providing 
powerful arguments to set the stage for discussions of implicit social cognition); Justin 
D. Levinson, SuperBias: The Collision of Behavioral Economics and Implicit Social 
Cognition, 45 AKRON L. REV. 591 (2012) [hereinafter SuperBias] (claiming that the 
behavioral law and economics decision model overlooks the role of implicit biases). See 
generally IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith 
eds., 2012). 
 39 See, e.g., Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Choosing Life or Death (Implicitly), in 
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 229 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, eds., 
2012) (noting that “race discrimination plagued the administration of the death penalty 
in Georgia”); Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of 
Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1539 (2004) (“Defense attorneys 
commonly suspect that the defendant’s race plays a role in prosecutors’ decisions to 
seek the death penalty, especially when the victim of the crime was white.”); Cynthia 
Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 UC DAVIS L. REV. 471 (2008) (discussing implicit bias in 
the context of sexual orientation bias); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: 
Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 353 (2007) 
[hereinafter Forgotten Racial Equality] (arguing that judges and juries remember and 
“misremember case facts in racially biased ways”); Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death and 
the Complicitous Mind, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 599 (2009) (“Considered in the legal 
context, well-developed social science principles may help reveal how people’s 
automatic and unintentional cognitive processes may either propagate racial disparities 
in the death penalty or serve as a making agent in covering up those disparities.”). 
 40 See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin Tone, 
Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgments of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 307, 309-
10 (2010) (noting that simple racial cues may evoke stereotypes affecting how jurors 
evaluate evidence); Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 
YALE L.J. F. 406, 406-07 (2017) (discussing implicit racial bias against African 
Americans in the criminal justice system); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious 
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For example, some of our projects have argued — many of them 
supported by direct empirical studies — that implicit bias functions in 
the way judges and jurors remember (and misremember) trial 
information,41 the way jurors perceive the presumption of innocence,42 
the way prosecutors proceed with cases, the way jurors evaluate 
evidence,43 the way death penalty jurors value human life,44 and more.45 
Social scientists have discovered that one of the core sources of 
implicit bias is culture. That is, if a particular culture does not contain 
assumptions, attitudes, stereotypes, or meaning about a certain group, 
relevant implicit biases about that group would not be expected to 
appear.46 Cultural influences, when they are present, can be expected to 
trigger implicit biases in young children and remain there throughout 
life.47 Furthermore, once implicit biases have been found to exist, 
research shows that they are difficult to eradicate.48 Psychological 
theorists continue to debate the question of what to do about implicit 
 
Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1195 (2009) (finding that judges 
have implicit biases that may work against African Americans); Robert J. Smith & Justin 
D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 796-97 (2012) (arguing that implicit biases skew 
prosecutorial decisions). 
 41 See Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality, supra note 39, at 373, 398-404.  
 42 See Danielle M. Young et al., Innocent Until Primed: Mock Jurors’ Racially Biased 
Response to the Presumption of Innocence, PLOS ONE, March 2014, at 3. 
 43 See generally LEVINSON & SMITH, IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 38. 
 44 See Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 32, at 542.  
 45 See Levinson & Young, supra note 40, at 309-10; Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty 
by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. 
L. 187, 204 (2010).  
 46 Some studies, for example, show that group-based stereotypes that exist in one 
culture may be entirely absent in another. In their study of stereotype threat in the 
United States and Canada, Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady found that the American 
stereotype of Asians being “good at math” was not a then-current stereotype among 
Asian women from Vancouver, Can. Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: 
Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 82 (1999). 
Thus, when measuring stereotype-threat, culturally bounded responses could be 
expected. See id. at 82-83. 
 47 See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit 
Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations From Ages 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 53, 57 (2006); see also Yarrow Dunham et al., From American City to Japanese 
Village: A Cross-Cultural Investigation of Implicit Race Attitudes, 77 CHILD DEV. 1268, 
1278 (2006). 
 48 See Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Reducing Automatically Activated Racial 
Prejudice Through Implicit Evaluative Conditioning, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 421, 422 (2006) (“The evidence that racial prejudices develop early and 
eventually become automatic has led most researchers to conclude that they are 
relatively difficult to change.”). 
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bias, largely due to the difficulty in reducing or eliminating implicit 
bias.49  
For present purposes, it is important to clarify the specific 
mechanisms whereby we propose that an implicitly biased association 
between race and retribution has developed in America. This Part, in 
turn, is structured around these mechanisms, which separate our 
implicit bias claim into two categories: one historical, and the other 
rooted in psychological studies of the human emotion surrounding 
retribution. The historical argument is straightforward: racialized 
punishment has so long defined the American criminal justice system 
that it has become impossible to conceptualize punishment without a 
racial element. The emotion-based element focuses on the human 
psychological forces that power the human desire to increase or 
decrease retribution: fear, anger, and empathy. When a decision-maker 
feels fear, anger, or both, the need for retribution automatically becomes 
heightened. When a decision-maker empathizes with the transgressor, 
however, the need for retribution becomes lessened. As we describe 
below, social science has demonstrated that most Americans 
automatically feel disproportionate fear and anger when racial elements 
are present.50 Similarly, Americans’ ability to empathize is at its lowest 
when racial group membership is relevant.51  
A. The Racial History of Retribution: Automatizing the Association 
The deep connection between race and retribution in American 
history underlies this Article’s modern-day claim that retribution can 
no longer be separated cognitively from race. Just as implicit racial bias 
has emerged from a cultural and historical association between certain 
groups and negative attitudes toward those groups, we propose that the 
historical use of punishment in racialized ways has led to the cognitive 
inseparability of race and retribution.  
 
 49 See Laurie A. Rudman, Social Justice in Our Minds, Homes, and Society: The Nature, 
Causes, and Consequences of Implicit Bias, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 129, 137-39 (2004) 
(addressing the topic of “[w]hat should we do about implicit biases” and recommending 
policy creation efforts, such as affirmative action, which would combat the harmful 
effects of implicit bias). Although much of the scholarship demonstrates that 
permanently reducing implicit bias is extremely difficult, some recent efforts have made 
progress in developing new intervention paradigms that seek to create more lasting 
reduction of implicit biases. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine et al., A Gender Bias Habit-
Breaking Intervention Led to Increased Hiring of Female Faculty in STEMM Departments, 
73 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 211 (2017) (noting that psychological interventions 
can promote gender equity). 
 50 See infra notes 69–113 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 114–135 and accompanying text. 
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As we have described, retribution has deep roots in the criminal law.52 
Those roots, though, have long been infected painfully with racial bias. 
Indeed, positive law used to treat Black Americans as though a 
transgression merited greater retribution if committed by a Black person 
than when a White person. “Slaves could receive the death penalty for 
at least sixty-eight offenses,” Judge Leon Higginbotham and Professor 
Anne Jacobs said, explaining Virginia law in the 1850s, “whereas for 
whites the same conduct either was at most punishable by 
imprisonment or was not a crime at all.”53 
Though positive law enshrining disproportionately harsh 
punishment for Black Americans no longer exists, race has continued 
to influence the calibration of punishment in such a way that Americans 
likely can no longer think of retribution as it was meant to be. Racialized 
retribution continued unhindered beyond the Emancipation of slaves. 
As Professor Dorothy Roberts explains, “[a]fter Emancipation, racial 
subjugation was accomplished less explicitly through the definition of 
crimes. . . . White law makers soon realized that they could return their 
former chattel to the condition of slaves by imprisoning them for a 
crime.”54 For example, many Southern states made petty larceny was a 
serious offense: Georgia law made hog stealing a felony in 1875, and the 
Missouri law defined grand larceny as the theft of property worth more 
than ten dollars and provided for punishment of up to five years hard 
labor.55  
Retribution is just as racialized now as it was 100 years ago.56 The 
modern era of racialized punishment can perhaps best understood in 
light of “superpredators,” the war on drugs, and capital punishment. In 
the context of racial politics, Professor Michael Tonry has traced the 
rhetoric and ensuing panic that led, at least in some significant part, to 
the punitive policies that allow for retributively extravagant 
punishments (mostly) for Black people. Tonry refers to the so-called 
“Southern Strategy,” the use of coded language intended to link Black 
people to crime and cause fear among moderate White voters, which 
 
 52 See supra notes 15–32 and accompanying text. 
 53 Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1955 
(1992-1993) (quoting A. Leon Higginbotham & Anne F. Jacobs, The “Law Only as an 
Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum 
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969 (1992)). 
 54 Id.  
 55 See id. at 1955-56. 
 56 See generally FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) (discussing the 
history of African Americans, lynching, and the death penalty). 
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was used by some Republican lawmakers, including the Nixon and 
Reagan campaigns (strong echoes of which continued into the first Bush 
era).57 In a very real sense then, the retributive extravagance of the drug 
laws of the 1980s and ’90s were simply continuations of a broader, 
sadder, historical trend — “The New Jim Crow,” as Professor Michelle 
Alexander famously dubbed it.58  
The specific case of capital punishment and its more than a century 
of continuous historical racialization perhaps best symbolizes the 
continuing racialized retribution of the American criminal justice 
system.59 Historical reflection shows a clear link between race and 
government sanctioned death, a link that persists in modern statistical 
analyses of capital punishment. When death penalty abolition gained 
traction in 1920s Louisiana, for example, editorial boards argued that 
the elimination of capital punishment would “increase the number of 
lynchings” and “the vengeance of an outraged citizenship.”60 The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Furman echoed this theme: “When people begin to 
believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon 
criminal offenders the punishment they ‘deserve,’” Justice Stewart 
wrote, “then there are sown the seeds of anarchy — of self-help, 
vigilante justice, and lynch law.”61 Professors Berman and Bibas made a 
similar argument three decades later in response to a U.S. Supreme 
Court decision barring the death penalty for the rape of a child (which 
incidentally is the case where Justice Kennedy warned of retributive 
excess). There, they argued that the law “channels retributive anger, 
limiting it to proportional payback and tempering it with neutral 
 
 57 See MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 2-4, 82 
(2011) (describing the “Southern Strategy”); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT — RACE, 
CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82 (1995). 
 58 See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010). 
 59 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (2002) (tracing 
the changes in the death penalty, from the category of crimes considered capital 
offenses, arguments for and against capital punishment, and the varied methods of 
execution); FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
America, supra note 56, at 1 (“[T]here is a long and deep connection between this 
country’s racial politics and its uses of the killings of African-Americans through 
lynchings and the death penalty . . . .”). See generally RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, 
AND THE LAW (1st ed. 1991) (discussing the intersection of race relations and America’s 
criminal justice system). 
 60 G. Ben Cohen, McCleskey’s Omission: The Racial Geography of Retribution, 10 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 65, 94 (2012) (citing ALEX MIKULICH & SOPHIE CULL, JESUIT SOC’Y 
RESEARCH INST., DIMINISHING ALL OF US: THE DEATH PENALTY IN LOUISIANA (2012), 
http://catholicsmobilizing.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/Death-Penalty-inLouisiana_ 
Full.pdf). 
 61 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972). 
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adjudicators and punishers.” Berman and Bibas wrote that “[i]f one 
squelches the impulse rather than channeling it, people may take the 
law into their own hands.”62 Taken together, this popular, judicial, and 
scholarly reliance on capital punishment as a means to curb extralegal 
lynchings, is vulnerable to attack on the grounds that the nation has 
sanitized and given the force of law to what essentially is racist vigilante 
justice.  
In the modern era, study after study confirms the continuing role of 
race in capital punishment. Professor Craig Haney frames the problem 
broadly, explaining that “between 1930 and 1982, African Americans 
constituted between 10% and 12% of the United States population, but 
53% of those executed.”63 When detailed statistical analyses are 
employed by researchers who seek to compare capital sentencing 
outcomes in similarly heinous killings, a striking and often confirmed 
finding (across many jurisdictions) is that Americans who murder 
White victims are significantly more likely to receive a death sentence 
than Americans who murder Black victims.64 
 
 62 Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 355, 360 (2008). 
 63 Craig Haney, Condemning the Other in Death Penalty Trials: Biographical Racism, 
Structural Mitigation, and the Empathic Divide, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2004) 
(citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1982 9 
(1984)). 
 64 See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL 
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 2 (1990) (“[A]lthough the levels of arbitrariness and racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing have declined in the post-Furman [v. Georgia] 
period, none of these promises have been fulfilled; moreover, given the Supreme Court’s 
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, little improvement in this regard appears likely.”); 
SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN 
CAPITAL SENTENCING xiii (1989) (“The Supreme Court has more or less acknowledged 
that race continues to play a major role in capital sentencing in America . . . . But the 
Court has decided to do nothing about this form of discrimination and to refuse to hear 
future claims based on it.”). See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-
90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 
(1990), https://www.gao.gov/assets/220/212180.pdf (finding a greater likelihood that a 
defendant would be charged with capital murder or receive the death penalty if the 
victim was White, rather than Black, as opposed to an outcome influenced by the race 
of defendant); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Opening Remarks: Race and the Death Penalty 
Before and After McCleskey, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 34, 40 n.21 (2007) (“Most of 
the studies find that the race of the victim is the principal determiner of sentence: killers 
of white victims are far more likely to be sentenced to death than killers of African-
American victims.”); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and 
the Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception, 
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411 (2004) (finding empirical evidence that the pre-Furman pattern 
of race-of-victim discrimination continues to characterize many death penalty systems 
post-Furman); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the 
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These powerful studies underscore the point that the most retributive 
punishment of all has been nearly continuously racialized. To give 
meaning to these overwhelming statistics, consider a story from Caddo 
Parish, La. Caddo Parish, La., is tied for the third most lynchings per 
capita of any county in the United States,65 and it is a place where the 
confederate flag flew proudly outside the county courthouse until 
2011.66 Though there is a sizable Black population in Caddo Parish 
today, a study found that capital juries are mostly White because 
prosecutors strike prospective Black jurors three times as often as White 
jurors.67 When a reporter asked Dale Cox, then Caddo Parish’s head 
prosecutor, about the wisdom of the death penalty in light of a death 
row exoneration, Cox effortlessly reflected the ties that bind race and 
retribution, telling a reporter: “I think we need to kill more people,” “I 
think revenge is a legitimate motive,” and that”[w]e’re not considered a 
society anymore — we’re a jungle.”68  
These examples, in historical context, demonstrate that the 
connection between race and retribution persists in today’s criminal 
 
Administration of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special 
Emphasis on the Post-1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194, 213-14 (2003) (documenting 
evidence revealing that while the defendant’s race alone is not significant in capital 
sentencing, race-of-victim factors, particularly Black defendant-White victim cases, 
offer the greatest disparate treatment and impact in sentencing); John H. Blume et al., 
Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
165, 167 (2004) (examining the composition of the death rows in eight states and 
finding that “[t]he different death sentence rates for black defendant-black victim cases 
and black defendant-white victim cases confirm the well-known race-of-victim effect”); 
Thomas J. Keil & Gennaro F. Vito, Race and the Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: 
1976-1991, 20 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 17, 30 (1995) (controlling for relevant factors, “Blacks 
who killed Whites were more likely to be charged with a capital offense and to receive 
a death sentence”). 
 65 See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF 
RACIAL TERROR (3d ed. 2017). 
 66 See Jeff Ferrell, Confederate Flag Comes Down Friday, KSLA NEWS 12 (Nov. 3, 
2011, 8:50 PM), http://www.ksla.com/story/15955226/caddo-parish-commission-
votes-to-remove-confederate-flag/ [https://perma.cc/4DU4-8GQ5]. 
 67 See Alexandria Burris, Black Jurors More Likely To Be Struck from Caddo Juries, 
SHREVEPORT TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://www.shreveporttimes.com/story/ 
news/local/2015/08/17/black-jurors-likely-struck-caddo-juries/31852745/ [https://perma. 
cc/7LL9-PXHM]. 
 68 Radley Balko, How a Fired Prosecutor Became the Most Powerful Law Enforcement 
Official in Louisiana, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/11/02/how-a-fired-prosecutor-became-
the-most-powerful-law-enforcement-official-in-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/76H9-QQE8]; 
Andrew Cohen, Sorry Seems to be the Hardest Word, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, (March 
31, 2015), http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/sorry-seems-be-hardest-word [https:// 
perma.cc/WDE2-3NPS]. 
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justice system. Yet, we do not believe that all examples of race and 
retribution today remain so easy to spot. In psychological terms, the 
shifting of bias from the “explicit” (or outspoken) to the “implicit” (or 
hidden) may track retribution’s shifting racialized role, from outright 
racial discrimination to embedded and structural racism. In light of the 
tight and continuing historical connection between race and 
retribution, and considering the fundamental importance of 
retribution’s supposed fairness to the American legal system, we now 
turn to investigate what the role of modern social science teaches us 
about how the human mind can turn culture into hidden automatic 
cognitive reality.  
B. Fear, Anger & Lack of Empathy: Racialized Corruption of the 
Psychological Levers of Retribution 
We have proposed that the association between race and retribution 
has become so historically infused in American culture that it has 
essentially become part of Americans’ automatic minds. Yet, this is only 
one reason why we suggest that an implicit race-retribution bias has 
emerged. The other reason is that the psychological fulcrums of 
retribution have also been corrupted by racial stereotypes. Thus, the 
race-retribution bias that we propose — and test in Part III — comes 
both from a history of racialized retribution as well as the racialized and 
psychological corruption of retribution’s drivers: fear, anger, and 
empathy. Each of these concepts (which in the context of retribution 
are meant to be pure and unpolluted measurements of punishment 
deservingness) pivot in intensity in direct response to racial cues. 
1. Race and Fear 
When societal fear spikes, in relation to real or perceived increases in 
crime, a retributive impulse kicks in and the punishment dial is often 
turned way up.69 As Professor Paul Robinson writes, “People’s opinions 
 
 69 See, e.g., Ronald Burns & Charles Crawford, School Shootings, the Media, and 
Public Fear: Ingredients for a Moral Panic, 32 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 147, 147, 152-53 
(1999) (discussing how school shootings around the nation have prompted several 
severe and punitive responses, including the suspension of bail for students charged 
with bringing guns to school, even though empirical data suggest that despite the 
shootings, schools remain safe places for children and school violence is lower today 
than it was several years ago); Dawn Rothe & Stephen Muzzatti, Enemies Everywhere: 
Terrorism, Moral Panic, and US Civil Society, 12 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 327, 339-42 
(2004) (noting that the presentation of terrorism and terrorists by the media after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 contributed to unnecessary levels of panic and fear and 
disproportionate reactions). 
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about the sentences required for proper criminal punishment fluctuate 
as a function of their current perceptions of the threat of crimes and, 
more generally, their state of fear.”70 Indeed, Professor Peter Enns, a 
political scientist at Cornell University, documented that across nearly 
400 national surveys over sixty years, “the public’s increasing 
punitiveness has been a primary determinant of the incarceration 
rate . . . .”71 Enns found that those results held constant even after 
controlling for “the crime rate, illegal drug use, inequality, and the party 
in power.”72 Fear thus drives the retributive impulse, and prosecutors 
and lawmakers respond with harsher punishment.  
This relationship between fear and the retributive impulse exists not 
only in the lawmaking or policy function, but also at the retail level — 
for example, in the context of police use of excessive force. Attention to 
excessive use of force skyrocketed in recent years in the wake of the 
shootings of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Miss., and Tamir Rice in 
Cleveland, Ohio, among other victims.73 In his book, Violence: A Micro-
sociological Theory, Professor Randall Collins describes the concept of 
“forward panic” — the process whereby fear escalates during heated 
interpersonal interactions, and when the momentum shifts in the 
conflict, a surge of adrenaline results in an overkill response that would 
not have happened under ordinary conditions.74 The kind of actions 
that derive from forward panic are simple vengeance, payback, revenge 
— even if not consciously so. It is the video footage of that retributive 
 
 70 PAUL H. ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT 136 (2013); 
see also DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 10 (2001) (noting that “[s]ince the 1970s fear of crime has 
come to have new salience,” resulting in the development of policies designed to reduce 
fear levels, not crime, and that according to public opinion research, a large public 
majority believes that crime rates are rising and “there is little public confidence in the 
ability of the criminal justice system to do anything about this”).  
 71 Peter K. Enns, The Public’s Increasing Punitiveness and Its Influence on Mass 
Incarceration in the United States, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857, 857-58 (2014). 
 72 Id. at 858. 
 73 See, e.g., Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Video Shows Cleveland Officer Shot Boy in 2 
Seconds, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/us/video-
shows-cleveland-officer-shot-tamir-rice-2-seconds-after-pulling-up-next-to-him.html 
(discussing a White officer’s shooting of a twelve-year-old black child holding a toy 
gun); see also Jonathan Cohn, Darren Wilson Walks: No Indictment for Michael Brown’s 
Killer, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120395/ 
ferguson-grand-jury-makes-issues-no-charges-officer-wilson (discussing a grand jury’s 
decision not to indict a White police officer who shot and killed an unarmed Black 
teenager). 
 74 See RANDALL COLLINS, VIOLENCE: A MICRO-SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 98-104 (2008) 
(describing the phenomenon of forward panic, and providing examples). 
  
2019] Race and Retribution 861 
surge — the continued force after the threat has ceded — often against 
unarmed Black men, that so infuriated millions of Americans.  
The fear that drives retributive demand is itself shaped by race. “There 
is nothing more painful to me at this stage in my life,” wrote renowned 
reverend and civil rights icon Jesse Jackson, “than to walk down the 
street and hear footsteps . . . then look around and see somebody white 
and feel relieved.”75 How can it be that one of the most respected Black 
leaders in America experiences fear at the sound of people walking 
behind him when he believes those people to be Black? Does Blackness 
itself trigger or amplify a sense of danger; a fear of crime victimization? 
Indeed, social scientists have confirmed that race often serves to trigger 
fear, one of the core elements that predict retributive urges. 
Cognitive psychology has shown that fear becomes disproportionally 
activated when Americans experience and interact with African 
Americans.76 For example, Professor Matthew Lieberman and his 
colleagues found that people given a brain scan while being exposed to 
a Black face — as opposed to a White face — show significantly more 
activity in the area of the brain thought to be involved in the processing 
of emotional responses to perceived threats.77 Moreover, when 
Professor Frank Gilliam inserted either a Black mugshot or a White 
mugshot into a fifteen-minute news program, participants who saw the 
Black mugshot registered greater concern for violent crime and also 
were more likely to blame Black Americans for rising crime rates.78 This 
racially-driven perceived dangerousness enhances the fear response, 
which, in turn, heats up the already flammable relationship between 
fear and retributive excess.  
Political scientists have also explored the relationship between race 
and fear. Professor Wesley Skogan, for example, found that the closer 
in proximity one lives to Black Americans, or the more racial bias one 
 
 75 Bob Herbert, Opinion, In America; A Sea Change on Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/12/opinion/in-america-a-sea-change-on-crime. 
html [https://perma.cc/44LW-XJYT].  
 76 See Matthew D. Lieberman et al., An fMRI Investigation of Race-related Amygdala 
Activity in African-American and Caucasian-American Individuals, 8 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 720, 720 (2005). See generally Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of 
Prejudice: Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 429, 435-36 (1999) (“[T]he 
perception that an outgroup constitutes a threat to ingroup interests or survival creates 
a circumstance in which identification and interdependence with the ingroup is directly 
associated with fear and hostility toward the threatening outgroup and vice versa.”). 
 77 See Lieberman et al., supra note 76, at 720. 
 78 See Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of 
Local Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 563-64 (2000).  
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exhibits, the more she or he tends to be fearful of crime.79 The findings 
also accord with a 2012 study by Justin Pickett and colleagues showing 
that fear of victimization increased when study participants were 
informed that the Black population is increasing.80  
In the 1990s, juvenile crime became racialized, and the widespread 
fear around the rise in juvenile homicides drove harsher punishment. 
“[F]atherless, Godless, and jobless,” is how Professors John DiIulio and 
John Fox described the “breed” of juvenile “superpredators” who would 
“kill, rape, maim, without giving it a second thought.”81 As Professor 
Michelle Alexander has pointed out, even Hillary Clinton, campaigning 
in support of the 1994 Crime Control Bill, partook in the fear-driven 
racial panic: “They are not just gangs of kids anymore . . . .They are 
often the kinds of kids that are called ‘super-predators.’ No conscience, 
no empathy. We can talk about why they ended up that way, but first 
we have to bring them to heel.”82 This racialized hysteria sounds 
laughable today83, but in the 1990s this racialized dehumanizing 
rhetoric relied on a fear-based retributive urge to stir the nation and 
spurred tough-on-crime legislation.84  
The retributive impulse, infused with racial undertones, also 
propelled an unprecedented punitiveness toward drug crimes beginning 
in the late 1980s and this uneven application of retribution has 
 
 79 Wesley G. Skogan, Crime and the Racial Fears of White Americans, 539 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 59, 59 (1995).  
 80 See Justin T. Pickett et al., Reconsidering the Relationship Between Perceived 
Neighborhood Racial Composition and Whites’ Perceptions of Victimization Risk: Do Racial 
Stereotypes Matter?, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 145, 169-70 (2012). 
 81 Editorial, Echoes of the Superpredator, supra note 7; John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming 
of the Super-Predators, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 27, 1995, 12:00 AM), https://www. 
washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/the-coming-of-the-super-predators [https:// 
perma.cc/3FWD-DQMS]. 
 82 Michelle Alexander, Why Hillary Clinton Doesn’t Deserve the Black Vote, NATION 
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/article/hillary-clinton-does-not-deserve-
Black-peoples-votes/ [https://perma.cc/FMM2-99XE]. 
 83 Indeed, Professor DiIulio acknowledges his error and Clinton — as the 
Democratic nominee for President in the 2016 election — went to great lengths to 
distance herself from her husband’s pro-carceral agenda. See Editorial, Echoes of the 
Superpredator, supra note 7 (quoting Professor DiIulio’s admission that “[t]hank god we 
were wrong” about the existence of superpredators). See also Anne Gearan & Abby 
Phillip, Clinton Regrets 1996 Remark on ‘Super-predators’ After Encounter with Activist, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/ 
wp/2016/02/25/clinton-heckled-by-black-lives-matter-activist/ [https://perma.cc/3HH6-
BZX9]. 
 84 See Alexander, supra note 82; see also Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: “De-
Coding” Colorblind Slurs During the Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates, 5 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 611, 613-14 (2000). 
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continued.85 Physicians opined on the “crack babies” that the “crack 
epidemic” in America’s poorest, Blackest neighborhoods would 
produce.86 Others warned of drug-related murders spilling out of the 
inner city and into the Whiter, wealthier neighborhoods that circle 
around the city like a doughnut.87 The most obvious example is the fear-
fueled moral panic that emerged over crack cocaine, a drug 
disproportionately used by Black Americans and for decades was 
disproportionately punished at the federal level relative to powdered 
cocaine by a measure of 100 to 1.88 At the state level, the American Civil 
Liberties Union has documented the imposition of life without parole 
sentences for non-violent offenders for “simple possession” crimes 
including possession of “a crack pipe,” “a trace amount of cocaine in 
clothes pockets that was so minute it was invisible to the naked eye and 
detected only in lab tests,” “a single, small crack rock at home,” and 
“two rocks of crack cocaine.”89  
 
 85 See ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 13 (1st ed. 1998) 
(“Nationally, there are twice as many black men in state and federal prison today as 
there were men of all races twenty years ago. More than anything else, it is the war on 
drugs that has caused this dramatic increase: between 1985 and 1995, the number of 
black state prison inmates sentenced for drug offenses rose by more than 700 percent.”); 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PUNISHMENT AND PREJUDICE: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE WAR ON 
DRUGS (May 2000), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/usa/ (reporting various statistics 
on racial disparities in arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing between 
White, Black and Latino Americans); JUSTICE POLICY INST., FINDING DIRECTION: 
EXPANDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING POLICIES OF OTHER NATIONS 23, 26 
(2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/finding_direction-
full_report.pdf (“The growth in the U.S. prison population has been fueled, in part, by 
the increase in incarceration for drug offenses. Between 1980 and 2006, the number of 
people incarcerated for drug offenses in state and federal prisons increased 1,412 
percent from 23,900 to 361,276. In 2006, 24 percent of the people in state and federal 
prisons were there because their most serious offense was a drug offense . . . . Drug 
policies in the United States . . . are shaped around the belief that drugs fuel crime and 
reducing drug use is accomplished by penalizing drug-related behaviors.”). See 
generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS (2012) (characterizing the war on drugs and mass incarceration as a 
system of racial control). 
 86 Interview by Michael Martin with Hallam Hurt, Professor, Univ. of Pa. Med. Sch. 
(July 31, 2013, 12:00 PM) (transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/ 
story/story.php?storyId=207292639 [https://perma.cc/ZC5L-NP6U]). 
 87 See Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 841, 853-57, 853 n.60 (discussing “crack-related murders”). 
 88 See Dvorak, supra note 84, at 615.  
 89 AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LIVING DEATH: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR NON-
VIOLENT OFFENSES 21 (2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/111813-lwop-complete-
report.pdf. 
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One of the most interesting contexts for a psychological discussion of 
the intersection of race and fear is policing, and in particular the ways 
in which police officers choose to use violence in certain encounters. 
Writing for The Atlantic, Seth Stoughton, a police officer turned law 
professor, suggested that racialized fear (“every encounter, every 
individual is a potential threat”), which is institutionalized through 
training (“[o]fficers … are shown painfully vivid, heart-wrenching 
dash-cam footage of officers being beaten, disarmed, or gunned down 
after a moment of inattention or hesitation”), is a prime reason why 
police shootings happen.90 Against this baseline level of fear, 
associations between Black faces and dangerousness, as Dr. Jennifer 
Eberhardt has found,91 only elevate fear levels. And, as Professor 
Stoughton put the point, “[b]ecause officers use more force when they 
perceive a greater threat, unconscious bias can lead officers to react 
more aggressively when confronting black men than they would when 
confronting others in otherwise identical situations.”92  
The connection between fear and racialized retribution also exists in 
the context of capital punishment. Consider the case of Duane Buck, a 
Black man with an IQ score of seventy-four,93 who was scheduled for 
execution in 2016 until his appeal was eventually heard by the Supreme 
Court that year.94 In Texas, before jurors can recommend a death 
sentence, the jury must find that the defendant would present a future 
danger to society if he received a life sentence instead of the death 
penalty. At the penalty phase of Buck’s capital murder trial, an expert 
witness testified that though Buck posed a low overall threat, “race” is 
a factor in future dangerousness calculations: “It’s a sad commentary 
that minorities, Hispanics and black people, are overrepresented in the 
criminal justice system.”95 The expert, Walter Quijano, later agreed 
 
 90 Seth Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths, ATLANTIC 
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/police-gun-
shooting-training-ferguson/383681/ [https://perma.cc/8QAZ-BKP4]. 
 91 Eberhardt et al., supra note 37, at 889. 
 92 Stoughton, supra note 90. 
 93 Ex parte Duane Edward Buck, 418 S.W.3d 98, 101 (2013) (noting that Buck had 
“an I.Q. of 74, at the ‘low end of the borderline range’”). 
 94 Duane Buck Resentenced to Life After Supreme Court Reversed Racially-Biased Death 
Sentence, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (Oct. 11, 2017), https://eji.org/news/duane-buck-
resentenced-to-life [https://perma.cc/M8R7-8334]. Buck was later re-sentenced to life 
in prison. Id.  
 95 Adam Liptak, Citing Racist Testimony, Justices Call for New Sentencing in Texas Death 
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with the prosecutor that “the race factor, black, increases the future 
dangerousness for various complicated reasons.”96 During closing 
argument, as part of her argument that Buck deserved to die, the 
prosecutor reminded the jury that Quijano “told you that there was a 
probability that the man would commit future acts of violence.”97  
2. Race and Anger 
Fear is not the only emotion that fuels the retributive appetite. 
“People punish in proportion to the extent that transgressions make 
them angry,” writes Joshua Greene, a Harvard experimental 
psychologist who studies retribution.98 Professor Martha Nussbaum 
provides insight into why anger finds an outlet in retribution: “emotions 
contain within themselves a directedness toward an object” such that 
“anger is not simply an impulse, a boiling of the blood,” but rather anger 
is “directed at someone, namely, a person who is seen as having 
wronged me.”99 Anger, then, reflects an emotional desire for retribution 
 
 96 Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Why the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Race-Based 
Evidence Matters, ABA J. (Mar. 2, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/ 
news/article/why_buck_v_davis_matters [https://perma.cc/TG8A-AZJX]. 
 97 R. J. MARATEA, KILLING WITH PREJUDICE: INSTITUTIONALIZED RACISM IN AMERICAN 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 147 (2019). Meanwhile, according to a letter that twenty-seven 
Evangelical Christian leaders sent to the Governor of Texas, in the fifteen years that he 
has lived on death row, “Buck has not received a single disciplinary write-up,” has 
“ministered to other prisoners and served as a role model to them,” and has “taken 
responsibility” and “expressed deep remorse” for his crimes. Marc Hyden, 27 
Evangelical Leaders Call for a New Fair Sentencing Hearing for Death Row Prisoner Duane 
Buck, CONSERVATIVES CONCERNED ABOUT DEATH PENALTY (Nov. 22, 2013), https:// 
conservativesconcerned.org/27-evangelical-leaders-call-for-a-new-fair-sentencing-
hearing-for-death-row-prisoner-duane-buck/ [https://perma.cc/N2UF-A4TD].  
 98 Greene, supra note 33, at 51. Anger may influence punishment at many different 
points during a trial. For example, “[a] crime scene photo or testimony from a murder 
victim’s parent might evoke anger or outrage toward the defendant, and thus function 
as an appraisal of the defendant’s conduct.” Susan A. Bandes & Jessica M. Salerno, 
Emotion, Proof and Prejudice: The Cognitive Science of Gruesome Photos and Victim Impact 
Statements, 62 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1007 (2014). “Angry jurors may be less likely to 
carefully and thoroughly evaluate a photo or a statement or the credibility of a witness, 
instead relying solely on their anger,” and “[j]urors who are angry with the defendant 
. . . may be motivated to seek out other evidence that validates their anger and to 
minimize or dismiss evidence that does not,” both of which could impact jurors’ 
punishment of the defendant. Id. at 1008.  
 99 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION IN PUBLIC LIFE 
60 (1995). 
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— a desire for “payback to condemn the crime, vindicate the victim, 
and denounce the wrongdoer.”100   
Professor Devon Johnson, a criminologist, found evidence for this 
anger-retribution link in public opinion data.101 Specifically, even after 
“controlling for other factors such as racial prejudice, fear of crime, 
causal attributions for criminal behavior, and political ideology,” 
national public opinion data demonstrates that “anger about crime is a 
significant predictor of punitive attitudes.”102   
As with fear, race has been shown repeatedly to be related to the way 
anger functions in the human mind.103 Consider, for example, the 
research that Professor John Bargh and colleagues performed on 
participants who were asked to complete repetitive, boring computer 
tasks.104 After a participant completed 130 trials, she or he would hear 
a beep and see an error message (“F11 error: failure saving data”).105 
The experimenter then told the participant that she would need to redo 
 
 100 Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Engaging Capital Emotions, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 355, 360 (2008); see also Bandes & Salerno, supra note 98, at 1005 (noting that 
“anger toward the defendant elicited by victim impact statements may result in an 
inability to remain open to evidence favoring the defense, to greater certainty about the 
verdict, and to a desire to punish”); Janice Nadler & Mary R. Rose, Victim Impact 
Testimony and the Psychology of Punishment, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 419, 443-44 (2003) 
(footnotes omitted) (“[T]he experience of anger is accompanied by a desire to attack, 
an instinct that is easily translated into a desire for punishment.”). 
 101 See Devon Johnson, Anger About Crime and Support for Punitive Criminal Justice 
Policies, 11 PUN. & SOC. 51, 51-62 (2009); see also Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Sober Second 
Thought: The Effects of Accountability, Anger, and Authoritarianism on Attributions of 
Responsibility, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 563, 570 (1998) (finding that 
inducing anger in people who were later asked to award tort damages in a seemingly 
unrelated study awarded more damages to a tort plaintiff and judged a defendant to be 
more deserving of punishment). But see Nadler & Rose, supra note 100, at 436 (finding 
that “[t]here were no significant differences in participants’ reported experience of 
feelings of disgust or anger based on the severity of victim impact statements” following 
a reading of a burglary vignette). 
 102 Johnson, supra note 101, at 51. Research from the field of behavioral economics 
also illustrates that an “angry individual will probably try to hurt the agent as a punitive 
revenge.” Francine Espinoza et al., Anger in Ultimatum Bargaining: Emotional Outcomes 
Lead to Irrational Decisions, 33 N. AM. ASSOC. IN CONSUMER RES. 264 (2006). This may 
be so even when that retributive response is “costly,” because “people often have 
tremendous difficulty restraining their costly aggressive impulses.” Cynthia Wang et 
al., Time Delay, Retribution, and Emotional Regulation, 116 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46, 49 (2011).  
 103 See infra notes 110–123 and accompanying text. 
 104 John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait 
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 
238 (1996).  
 105 Id.  
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the entire task from the beginning.106 A hidden camera captured the 
responses of participants. Participants primed with a consciously 
imperceptible image of a Black face immediately before the computer 
crash exhibited significantly more hostile reactions — including anger 
— than participants who did not see the image of the Black face.107 In 
other words, among a group of participants provoked with a frustrating 
task, exposure to a Black face prime amplified hostility.  
Social psychologist Nilanjana Dasgupta and colleagues posit that 
anger produces “a psychological readiness to evaluate outgroups 
negatively vis-à-vis ingroups, thus creating an automatic prejudice 
against the outgroup from thin air.”108 For example, though not 
specifically in the context of Black-White bias, Dasgupta and colleagues 
found that participants who experienced more anger showed more anti-
Arab bias on an implicit association test than participants who 
experienced less anger.109 Nonetheless, the principle is the same: anger 
enhances out-group bias.  
So far, this discussion of racialized anger and retribution has assumed 
a progression — race amplifies anger which in turn amplifies retributive 
impulse. But there is another pathway through which race and anger 
operate together. Not only do people feel more anger themselves in a 
racialized context, they additionally perceive out-group others to be 
angrier. For example, researchers have shown that people perceive 
“anger” or “hostility” in Black faces faster and with more intensity than 
when the emotive faces are White.110 Moreover, in the context of a 
school fight, study participants perceive shoves as more aggressive 
when the person who does the shoving is Black.111 Thus, in perceiving 
both actions and emotions in the faces of others, people tend to see 
Black Americans as more hostile.112  
Finally, as an additional amplification of the role of anger in the 
retributive urge, researchers have shown that anger is highly 
 
 106 Id.  
 107 See id. at 239. 
 108 David DeSteno et al., Prejudice from Thin Air: The Effect of Emotion on Automatic 
Intergroup Attitudes, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 319, 323 (2004). 
 109 Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence of Specific 
Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585, 589 (2009). 
 110 See Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice 
and the Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640, 643 (2003). 
 111 See Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup 
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 590, 596 (1976). 
 112 See, e.g., id.; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, supra note 110, at 643.  
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contagious.113 Thus, again in the context of policing, if a police officer 
detects anger in the face of a Black suspect or prisoner (and because 
anger is a contagious emotion), the officer becomes angry and that 
anger amplifies the demand for retribution. Consider a prison guard 
who threatened to kill an old man who would not comply with his 
orders, or a police officer who believed that a Black driver was 
“resisting” arrest, or the Louisiana man whose friends back home in the 
“jungle” needed to be sent a message. Would a White prisoner look a 
little less hostile, a White driver a little less aggressive, a White 
defendant a little less angry?  
3. Race and Lack of Empathy 
Unlike anger and fear, which intensify retributive demand, empathy 
serves to lessen the impact of it. Yet, here too, racial cues likely 
automatically interfere with Americans ability to counterbalance their 
own desires to punish harshly. Thus, not only are fear and anger 
themselves automatically intensified by racial stereotypes, but the 
primary safeguard to protect over-punishment — empathy — will be 
similarly skewed.114 
People often view those who commit crimes, especially violent 
crimes, as “lacking core human capacities,” “subhuman and beastly,” 
“less sensitive to pain,” and more deserving of “severe and coercive 
forms of punishment.”115 Cesare Lombroso, the so-called “father of 
criminology,” “proposed that criminality was biological and that 
criminals were atavistic savages — sub-humans that resembled apes in 
both their physical and behavior characteristics.”116 Seeing criminals as 
a “species of bloodthirsty beasts,” Lombroso rejected empathy for 
offenders because he believed they did not deserve our “compassion.”117 
In more modern times, neuroimaging studies reveal that people react to 
extremely marginalized social groups, such as homeless people, drug 
addicts and prisoners with a complete “absence of the typical neural 
 
 113 See Shirley Wang, Contagious Behavior, ASS’N PSYCHOL. SCI. OBSERVER (Feb. 1, 
2006), https://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/contagious-behavior [https:// 
perma.cc/CU8M-L8HG]. 
 114 See Sophie Trawalter et al., Racial Bias in Perception of Others’ Pain, PLOS ONE 1, 
7 (2012) (finding race effects on observers’ ratings of pain). 
 115 Brock Bastian et al., The Roles of Dehumanization and Moral Outrage in Retributive 
Justice, PLOS ONE, April 2013, at 1. 
 116 Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Cops and Criminals: The Interplay of 
Mechanistic and Animalistic Dehumanization in the Criminal Justice System, in HUMANNESS 
AND DEHUMANIZATION 147, 149 (Paul G. Bain et al. eds., 2013). 
 117 Id. 
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signature for social cognition.”118 As psychologists Rebecca Hetey and 
Jennifer Eberhardt put the point, dehumanization is an important 
prerequisite to retributive excess because “people are more likely to 
commit violence against a group they do not view as fully human, and 
are more likely to view such violence as acceptable because its target, as 
not fully human, is not deserving of the moral concern that humans owe 
each other.”119 As a matter of history, social fact and even neuroscience, 
then, people tend to react to criminals by dehumanizing them.  
Race can further block empathy when a target of the retributive 
impulse is made out to be less than fully human.120 Psychologist and 
professor Phillip Goff and colleagues, for example, connect racialized 
dehumanization by demonstrating the still-present connection between 
race and animal stereotypes.121 In their studies, the researchers found, 
among other things, that study participants who were primed with a 
consciously imperceptible image of a Black face were faster to recognize 
 
 118 Lasana Harris & Susan Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low, 18 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 846, 852 (2006). 
 119 Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 116, at 148 (citations omitted); see also Phillip 
Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical Dehumanization, and 
Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 292, 292-94 (2008) 
(discussing pervasive Black-ape stereotypes and their role in increased dehumanization 
of and violence against Black Americans). 
 120 Professors Mona Lynch and Craig Haney traced the cause of some of these 
disparities to differing evaluation of the strength of mitigation evidence depending on 
the race of the defendant. See Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Looking Across the Empathic 
Divide: Racialized Decision Making on the Capital Jury, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 573, 577 
(2011) (noting “[s]everal recent studies have documented racial bias against Black 
defendants, apart from the interactive effect that the race of defendant has with the race 
of victim” and indicating that race of defendant bias is “especially likely to operate in 
the juries’ penalty phase decision making”); id. at 603 (“[R]acial bias is often manifested 
through a lack of empathy for the defendant and disregard for mitigating evidence — 
especially mitigation that stems from the defendant’s life experiences that jurors may 
perceive are not directly connected to the crime itself.”). Dubbing these disparities the 
“empathic divide,” Lynch and Haney concluded that they “were likely the result of the 
jurors’ inability or unwillingness to empathize with a defendant of a different race.” Id. 
at 584. This evidence of an empathy gap aligns with the results of interviews with over 
one thousand jurors who served on real-life capital juries that confirm this dynamic: 
“White and Black men typically came to very different conclusions about what they 
perceived to be the Black defendant’s remorsefulness, dangerousness, and his ‘cold-
bloodedness,’” and “Black men reported being more empathic toward the defendants in 
these cases than any other category or group of juror.” Id. at 580. Since capital jurors 
are predominately White, the empathic divide is about the inability of White jurors “to 
fully appreciate the life struggles of a Black capital defendant and take those struggles 
into account in deciding on his sentence.” Id. at 584. 
 121 See Phillip Atiba Goff et al., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge, Historical 
Dehumanization, and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
292, 292 (2008). 
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a blurry image as an ape than were participants primed with a White 
face.122 Moreover, when primed with an image of an ape, and then 
shown a screen with both a White face and a Black face, participants 
identified a visible “dot probe” positioned over a Black face more 
quickly than when not primed.123 In other words, there is an ease of 
association between Black faces and apes.124 This dehumanizing linkage 
has disturbing consequences. Professor Goff and colleagues showed a 
video of police officers severely and repeatedly striking a Black suspect 
at the conclusion of a car chase.125 When participants were primed with 
the word “ape,” they were more likely to report that the use of force was 
appropriate.126 
Professors Aneeta Rattan and her colleagues investigated the effects 
of racialized empathy in a study where participants read about a 
fourteen-year-old boy who sexually assaulted an elderly woman.127 
Participants who read about a Black juvenile, as opposed to those who 
read about a White juvenile, exhibited increased support for the idea 
that juveniles and adults are similarly culpable for their actions.128 In 
other words, race appears to block youthfulness as a mitigating factor.  
Professor Levinson, Robert Smith, and Dr. Danielle Young found, in 
a 2014 study of jury-eligible citizens in six leading death penalty states, 
that citizens implicitly devalued the lives of Black Americans compared 
to White Americans on an IAT test designed to measure possible bias in 
the implicit relative value of White and Black lives.129 The researchers 
asked jury-eligible participants to group together photos of White and 
Black Americans with words that represent either value or lack of value. 
The results of the study found that participants associated Black 
Americans with worthlessness and White Americans with worth, a 
 
 122 Id. at 295-96. 
 123 Id. at 298. 
 124 Id. at 292. 
 125 Id. at 302. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Aneeta Rattan et al., Race and the Fragility of the Legal Distinction Between Juveniles 
and Adults, PLOS ONE, May 2012, at 2. 
 128 See id.  
 129 Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 32, at 553, 556, 559. Interestingly, 
statistical analysis also revealed that the bias gap between death-qualified and 
excludable jurors was driven by the exclusion of non-White jurors from the jury pool 
through the process of death-qualification. Id. at 559-60. In other words, death 
qualification, supposedly a race-neutral process integral to capital trials, might itself 
lead to juries disproportionately likely to dehumanize Black defendants. See id.  
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finding that connects directly to the implicit harms of racialized value 
and empathy.130 
There is an interesting twist when it comes to dehumanization, and 
especially the link between race and pain: the dehumanization of Black 
victims can further lead to an undervaluing of harm.131 When a person 
witnesses another person in pain, she or he empathizes with that 
person’s suffering.132 However, when the bearer of pain is Black, and 
especially if the observer is White, implicit racial bias can mute the 
empathic response.133 A 2012 study by Dr. Sophie Trawalter and 
colleagues found that White people, including medical professionals, 
rate pain inducing situations — a stubbed toe, getting a door slammed 
shut on one’s hand, a paper-cut — as less painful when the bearer of the 
pain was Black than when she or he was White.134 These results accord 
with other studies showing that study participants show less activity in 
the “pain matrix” of the brain when seeing a needle penetrate the face 
of an out-group member (“them”) than when the same needle 
penetrates the face of an in-group member (“us”).135 
The psychological levers of retribution — fear, anger, and lack of 
empathy — are thus all part of the implicit racial bias matrix. These 
racialized levels amplify the close connection between race and 
retribution, and support our contention that race and retribution have 
become inextricably intertwined. Having set forth the theory behind our 
claim, we sought to test it empirically. The empirical study we present 
in the next Part investigated our thesis in a national study of jury-
eligible Americans.  
III. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY: A NATIONAL TEST OF THE RACIAL 
ARCHITECTURE OF RETRIBUTION 
Building upon the historical connection between race and retribution, 
as well as social science theory demonstrating that the core pillars for 
retribution are each tainted by implicit bias, we set out to design an 
empirical study that could test whether retribution has indeed become 
automatically associated with race in ways that are deeply and 
 
 130 Id. at 559.  
 131 See Matteo Forgiarini et al., Racism and the Empathy for Pain on Our Skin, 
FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., May 2011, at 5-6. 
 132 See id. at 1. 
 133 See id. at 4-6. 
 134 Trawalter et al., supra note 114, at 3-4. 
 135 See, e.g., Xiaojing Xu et al., Do You Feel My Pain? Racial Group Membership 
Modulates Empathic Neural Responses, 29 J. NEUROSCIENCE 8525, 8525, 8528 (2009). 
  
872 University of California, Davis [Vol. 53:839 
automatically engrained in Americans’ cognitions. We thus designed a 
novel Implicit Association Test (“IAT”) and deployed it, along with a 
range of punishment-related measures, across a national sample of over 
520 jury-eligible citizens. The study provided us the opportunity 
analyze the potentially long-hidden interaction of retribution and race 
in the criminal justice system. This Part reports in detail the empirical 
study, beginning with the methods we employed and concluding with 
the study results. 
A. Methods 
1. Jury-Eligible Participants 
We recruited a national sample in order to determine whether 
retribution has become inexorably associated with race, and in 
particular whether the racial architecture of retribution has led 
American citizens to think about Black Americans in a manner infused 
with an implicit desire to punish. The study included a diverse group of 
522 jury-eligible citizens.136 Participants ranged in age, 38.4% of 
participants falling within the ages of 31 to 40.137 Of the participants in 
the study, 44.8% identified as female and 55.2% identified as male. In 
terms of racial diversity, 77.5% of participants identified themselves as 
White, 7.8% identified themselves as Black or African American, 5.5% 
as Asian American, 3.6% as Hispanic or Latino, and 4.8% as more than 
one race.138 As with most jury pools, the participant pool demonstrated 
substantial educational diversity — 35.1% of participants reported 
holding a bachelor’s degree, 28.4% indicated that they had completed 
some college, 11.1% reported holding an associate degrees, 12.4% 
identified as high school graduates, and 6.9% reported holding master’s 
degrees.139 Politically, participants were asked how strongly they 
typically agreed with liberals and conservatives on a range of issues: 
37.4% reported affiliating very strong or strongly with liberal positions; 
15.1% reported affiliating strongly or very strongly with conservative 
 
 136 Participants were recruited using a national online recruitment service. 
Participants who were non-citizens or convicted felons were excluded from the dataset, 
because they would likely be excluded from jury service.  
 137 The second most common age range was twenty-one to thirty, with 33.6% falling 
within this age range. The third most common age range was forty-one to fifty, with 
14.9% falling in this range. 
 138 Two participants identified themselves as Native American, although several 
others identified as Native American combined with another group.  
 139 Three percent of participants held one of various advanced degrees, including 
PhD, MD, JD, MBA, and others.  
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positions, and the remainder reported agreeing slightly more often with 
liberal positions (17.7%), or slightly more often with conservative 
positions (15.8%). The remainder of participants identified as being 
ideologically neutral (13.9%). 
2. Empirical Study Methods 
Testing whether jury-eligible citizens harbor automatically raced 
associations underlying retribution requires implementing a study 
method that does not simply rely on jury eligible citizens’ self-reports, 
but instead measures implicit associations. Fortunately, social scientists 
began using various implicit measures in the 1980s and ’90s that can 
test how people’s automatic cognitions work. For example, one such 
method, known as “priming,” exposes participants to either a known or 
unknown stimuli and then measures responses, comparing an 
experimental condition to a control conduction.140 For example, 
researchers have found that research participants who hear rap music 
songs, as opposed to pop songs, make much harsher judgments of an 
ambiguous actor’s behavior, a finding they attributed to the music’s 
automatic activation of negative Black stereotypes.141 In relation to 
criminal punishment, for example, researchers have found that priming 
citizens with prison photos depicting a greater percentage of Black 
inmates (as opposed to prison photos depicting a lesser percentage of 
Black inmates) negatively affects those citizens’ willingness to take 
social action to address harsh punishment laws.142 
Perhaps the most popular method of measuring implicit associations 
is the Implicit Association Test. The IAT is a game-like measure that 
pairs an “attitude object” (such as a particular group, e.g., women or 
Muslim Americans) with an “evaluative dimension” (positive or 
negative) and tests how the speed (measured in milliseconds) and 
accuracy of participants’ responses indicate automatic associations 
 
 140 For examples of priming and a detailed summary of psychological research on 
priming, see Justin D. Levinson et al., Implicit Racial Bias: A Social Science Overview, in 
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 38, at 10-15 [hereinafter Implicit Racial 
Bias] (summarizing psychological research on priming and providing examples). 
 141 See Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit Consequences of 
Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 
133, 138-39 (2002).  
 142 See Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration 
Increase Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1949, 1949-51 (2014) (finding 
that when California prisons were visually “represented as ‘more Black,’ people were 
more concerned about crime and expressed greater acceptance of punitive policies than 
when the penal institution was represented as ‘less Black’”). 
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between concepts.143 Study participants sit at a keyboard (frequently at 
their own computer) and are instructed to match an attitude object (for 
example, Muslim or Christian, woman or man; gay or straight) with 
either an evaluative dimension (for example, positive or negative) or an 
attribute dimension (for example, moral or immoral, valuable or 
worthless) by pressing a designated response key as quickly as possible. 
For example, in one task, participants are instructed to rapidly pair 
together pictures of Muslim American names with positive words. In a 
second task, participants are instructed to pair Muslim American names 
with negative words. The variance in the speed at which people can 
respond to the two tasks is understood as the strength of the attitude. 
For example, if participants pair the words in the first task faster than 
those in the second task, they are demonstrating implicitly positive 
attitudes toward Muslim Americans. If they, however, are faster to 
respond to tasks that require categorizing old people with slow than 
tasks that require categorizing old people with fast, they are 
demonstrating implicit age stereotyping. 
Social scientists Nilanjana Dasgupta and Anthony Greenwald have 
accurately summarized the logic underlying the IAT: “When highly 
associated targets and attributes share the same response key, 
participants tend to classify them quickly and easily, whereas when 
weakly associated targets and attributes share the same response key, 
participants tend to classify them more slowly and with greater 
difficulty.”144 Social psychologists Laurie Rudman and Richard 
Ashmore concur: “The ingeniously simple concept underlying the IAT 
is that tasks are performed well when they rely on well-practiced 
associations between objects and attributes.”145  
Building on our overall theory regarding the racial architecture of 
retribution, we created what we call the “Retribution IAT.” We 
developed this IAT to specifically test the hypothesis that retribution 
and race have become cognitively inseparable. If indeed retribution and 
race have become cognitively associated even at the automatic level, we 
predicted that this IAT should likely be able to detect it. Participants in 
our study were therefore asked to categorize photos of Black and White 
 
 143 This description of the IAT in this paragraph and the next is derived heavily, 
sometimes verbatim, from our prior description of it. Levinson et al., Implicit Racial 
Bias, supra note 140, at 16-17.  
 144 Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic 
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 
81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803 (2001). 
 145 Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit 
Association Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 359, 359 (2007).  
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men and women146 with words associated with “Payback” (the stimuli 
words being Retaliate, Revenge, Payback, Avenge, Punish, Get Even, 
Retribution), as well as words associated with “Mercy” (the stimuli 
words being Leniency, Redemption, Forgive, Mercy, Pardon, Compassion, 
and Sympathy). Thus, in the first task,147 participants were instructed to 
group together Black faces with Payback words, as well as White faces 
with Mercy words, and in the second task, participants were instructed 
to group together Black faces with Mercy words, as well as White faces 
with Payback words. If participants more quickly associated Black faces 
with Payback words, and White faces with Mercy words, as compared 
to Black faces with Mercy words, and White faces with Payback words, 
we could thus conclude that a Race-Retribution implicit bias exists. 
Because we were interested not only in implicit associations between 
race and retribution, but also how these associations may manifest in 
decisions regarding criminal punishment, we asked participants a range 
of questions, including self-report measures designed to measure their 
support of retributive and mercy punishment philosophies. The 
punishment philosophy questions, in particular, consisted of four 
items, two formulated to measure support for retributive punishment 
(“A person who commits the harshest crime deserves the harshest 
punishment” and “Those who hurt others deserve to be hurt in 
return”), and two formulated to measure mercy or rehabilitation-based 
punishment (“People who commit serious crimes often should receive 
treatment instead of punishment” and “People who commit serious 
crimes sometimes deserve leniency”).148 Participants were asked how 
much they agreed or disagreed with those statements on a 1-7 scale. 
Responses to the two retributive punishment questions were then 
totaled into an average Retribution support score, and responses to the 
two mercy punishment questions were totaled into an average Mercy 
support score.  
In addition to participants’ retributive and mercy-based punishment 
philosophies, we measured their recommended punishments for 
 
 146 The photographs we used for the study have previously been used in many 
studies. See, e.g., Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes 
and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 52 (2007). 
 147 This task order is presented in order to give a clear example of the study. The 
order of the two tasks was counterbalanced, in order to minimize the effects of task 
order. Thus, approximately half of the participants were first asked to pair together 
Black with Mercy, and White with Payback.  
 148 These questions were also used in a study of American judges’ punishment 
philosophies as well as implicit biases. See Mark W. Bennett et al., Judging Federal White-
Collar Fraud Sentencing: An Empirical Study Revealing the Need for Further Reform, 102 
IOWA L. REV. 939, 970 (2017). 
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specific crimes. To do this, participants were presented with six 
hypothetical crimes (in randomized order) and were asked to indicate 
how severe the punishment should be for each crime (on a 1-7 scale). 
Two of the six crimes, which were largely based upon real crimes, were 
as follows: 
The defendant robbed a gas station. He carried a gun during the 
robbery, but had told his friends beforehand that he did not plan to 
fire it. In the middle of the robbery, the store clerk was shot and 
killed. The prosecution argues that the killing was cold-blooded and 
intentional. The defense claims that the gun went off accidentally 
as he was pointing it at the clerk; and 
The defendant broke into his neighbor’s home, expecting that the 
home was empty. However, the neighbor was home, and when he 
threatened to call the police, the defendant picked up a baseball bat 
that was lying on the floor and struck the homeowner in the head. 
The homeowner died. The defendant, who was 14 years old at the 
time, was charged in adult court.  
Prior to reading about the individual crimes, participants read a one-
page document that was labeled as a press release from a District 
Attorney’s office.149 The design of the press release was to prime 
 
 149 The press release was titled, “Task Force Tackles Surge in Drug Dealing and Violent 
Crime,” and contained the following text describing a task force created by the District 
Attorney: 
Houston District Attorney Devon Anderson Harris announced today the formal 
commencement of a task force focused on reducing the dangerous increase in drug 
dealing and other violent crime in the city. While the rates of some major crimes 
held steady, other crimes, such as drug dealing, robbery, and rape increased 23%. 
In response to this concerning increase, the District Attorney formed a task force 
last month comprised of four veteran prosecutors, seven senior detectives from the 
police department, and two probation officers.  
According to the District Attorney’s Office, the task force already has secured 
convictions against a number of criminals who were each responsible for multiple 
drug dealing and weapon possession offenses. In fact, the District Attorney 
announced that four criminals were convicted of drug dealing with a weapon on 
January 5, 2016: Brett Walsh, age 21, Greg Baker, age 21, Nestor Garcia, age 25, 
and Todd Sullivan, age 19. 
District Attorney Harris said that the DA’s office has instructed the task force to 
seek the maximum punishment in every drug dealing or violent crime case. If you 
see any suspicious activities or people in your neighborhood, please call 911 
immediately. 
Participants who were randomly assigned to the African American press release 
condition read the same press release, except three of the four participants’ names were 
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participants either for Black crime, White crime, or simply just crime 
(no racial categorization). The primary purpose for the inclusion of the 
press release was to measure whether activating participants’ racial 
stereotypes would ultimately affect participants’ punishment judgments 
for the specific crimes we presented.150  
Participants were also “death qualified” to determine if they would be 
eligible to sit on a death-penalty jury or if they would be excluded due 
to their unwillingness to follow jury instructions on imposing death 
penalty in certain circumstances. They were asked first whether they 
would be able to “find the defendant guilty in light of the fact that he 
may receive the death penalty,” and second if the defendant were 
convicted, whether they would be able to consider “both a life sentence 
without the possibility of parole and a sentence of death.”  
If participants responded that they would be unwilling to convict the 
defendant if death were a possible punishment, if participants 
responded that they would be unwilling to sentence any defendant to 
death, even if found guilty, or if participants responded that they would 
always vote to impose the death penalty after a conviction for murder, 
these “non-death qualified” participants’ data was able to be separated 
so that it could be compared with the data of jurors who would be 
eligible to sit on a death penalty jury. Because these groups would be 
excluded from sitting on capital juries for different reasons, we coded 
these responses separately into the following four categories: 
(1) Death Qualified Jurors. These are participants who 
answered yes to both questions, and would therefore be 
qualified to sit on capital juries (n=368); 
(2) Death Always Jurors. These are participants who 
answered, “I would always vote for the death penalty,” and 
 
different. Participants in this condition thus read about Darnell Jackson, Jamal Harris, 
Nestor Garcia, and Rasheed Washington. Participants in both the White American press 
release condition and the African American press release condition read about Nestor 
Garcia, who was always listed as third in the list of four. We included this name in order 
to minimize the chances that participants would become suspicious of the purpose of 
the press release task. Thus, participants read about three of four White-sounding 
names, three of four Black-sounding names, or did not read any names at all (control 
condition). 
 150 Justin D. Levinson and Danielle Young have previously found that priming 
matters in punishment judgments and evidence evaluations. See Levinson & Young, 
supra note 40, at 331-39 (finding that participants evaluated evidence differently based 
upon the skin tone of the perpetrator). 
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would therefore be excluded from sitting on capital juries 
(n=31);151 
(3) Nullifiers. These are participants who responded that they 
would not be able to find the defendant guilty in light of the fact 
that he may receive the death penalty (n=90); and 
(4) Witherspoon Excludables. These are participants who 
reported that they would be able to find the defendant guilty, 
but could never vote for a sentence of death (n=33).152 
3. Hypotheses 
Based on our theory of the racial architecture of retribution, we made 
the following hypotheses prior to conducting the test: 
Hypothesis 1: Jury eligible citizens will automatically (implicitly) 
associate Black with retribution and White with leniency. Thus, 
on the IAT we conducted, jury eligible citizens will specifically 
associate Black with Payback and White with Mercy. 
Hypothesis 2: Death Qualified Jurors will possess stronger 
implicit race-retribution biases (Black-Payback and White-
Mercy) than Nullifiers or “Witherspoon” Excludables. 
Hypothesis 3: Death Qualified Jurors will be more retributive 
(on retribution philosophy questions) and less supportive of 
mercy (on mercy philosophy questions) than jurors who would 
be excludable, except that Death Always Jurors will be the most 
retributive. 
Hypothesis 4: Participants in the Black-sounding name press 
release condition will report harsher punishment scores on 
individual crimes, and will self-report stronger retributive 
philosophy support, as compared to the White-sounding name 
condition and the control group condition. 
Hypothesis 5: Jury eligible citizens’ implicit bias levels will 
predict their how severely they seek to punish, as well as their 
overall sentencing philosophy. Specifically, stronger race-
 
 151 See generally Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding that a juror 
who would always vote for the death penalty, regardless of instruction, must be 
removed for cause). 
 152 See generally Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517-18 (1968) (examining 
whether excluding jurors opposed to capital punishment violated a prisoner’s right to 
an impartial jury). 
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retribution biases as found on the IAT will predict harsher 
punishment for specific crimes and greater support for 
retributive theories of punishment. 
B. Results: Retribution and Race Implicitly Intertwined 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted several statistical analyses. For 
Hypothesis 1, we conducted a t-test that compared the IAT “D” score 
to 0 in order to test for significance. For Hypotheses 2-4, we conducted 
ANOVAs,153 and for Hypothesis 5, we conducted regression analyses to 
test the predictive validity of the IAT. The study results were as follows:  
1. Jury-Eligible Citizens Displayed an Implicit Race-Retribution 
Bias 
Jury eligible citizens demonstrated a significant implicit association 
between Black and retribution, whereby they associated Black with 
Payback and White with Mercy on the IAT. Participants were faster to 
categorize Black faces with retributive words and White faces with 
mercy words.154  
2. Death Qualified Jurors Held Stronger Implicit Racial Biases 
Than Nullifiers and Witherspoon Excludables 
Death Qualified participants showed higher levels of an implicit 
Black-retribution bias than Nullifiers and Witherspoon Excludables. 
Indeed, as we found in another context with implicit associations 
between Black and the value of human life, here we confirmed our 
hypothesis that the death qualification process actually excludes the 
least biased citizens.155 
 
 153 Generally speaking, Analysis of Variance (“ANOVA”) represents several 
statistical techniques that separate the variance in a dataset into specific sources of 
variance, which allows statisticians to compare means between multiple groups. See 
generally BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS 
322-23 (Rebecca Pascal ed., 4th ed. 2001) (describing ANOVA and related statistical 
techniques).  
 154 The t-test showed that as we hypothesized IAT d score significantly higher than 
0 (M=0.34, SD=0.33, t(521)=23.51, p<.001 ). For this particular test, a higher score 
represents stronger implicit associations between Black and Retributive attitudes, and 
White and Mercy attitudes. 
 155 Jurors F(3,518)=2.82, p<.05, ηp2=.02, MDeath Qualified = 0.36 (SD=0.33), MDeath Always 
= 0.42 (SD=0.34), MExcludables = 0.33 (SD=0.32), MNullifiers = 0.26 (SD=0.34). 
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3. Death Qualified Jurors Were More Punitive, More Retributive, 
and Less Merciful Than Excludables 
Death Qualified Jurors were more punitive, more retributive, and less 
merciful as compared to jurors who would be excluded because either 
they would never convict a defendant if the death penalty was an option, 
or would never, post-conviction, vote for the death penalty. Statistically, 
there were three interrelated findings, each statistically significant, that 
differentiated the results of jury eligible citizens and those who would 
be excluded from serving on capital juries because of their opposition 
to the death penalty. First, Death Qualified Jurors were harsher in their 
judgments as to how severely individual crimes should be punished.156 
Second, Death Qualified Jurors were more likely to self-report 
agreement with retributive punishment theories,157 and third, death 
qualified jurors were less likely to self-report agreement with mercy 
punishment theories.158 In addition, Death Always Jurors, who would 
be excluded because they would always vote for death, were 
significantly more retributive and less merciful, both on the individual 
crimes and in theory, than even Death Qualified Jurors. 
4. Implicit Bias Score Predicted Death Qualification Status 
Based on the results that Death Qualified Jurors possessed stronger 
associations between Black and retribution, and our previous finding of 
similar results on other IATs (whereby death qualified jurors harbored 
stronger anti-Black implicit biases than jurors who would be excluded), 
we wanted to understand what determined participants’ death 
qualification status. In other words, we were interested in 
 
 156 Crime1: F(3,518)=19.27, p<.001, ηp2=.10, MDeath Qualified = 5.93(SD=0.99), MDeath 
Always = 6.52(SD=0.77), MExcludables = 5.33(SD=1.11), MNullifiers = 5.20(SD=1.26), Crime2: 
F(3,518)=11.87, p<.001, ηp2=.06, MDeath Qualified = 5.56(SD=1.24), MDeath Always = 
6.10(SD=1.04), MExcludables = 4.79(SD=1.45), MNullifiers = 4.89(SD=1.52), Crime3: 
F(3,518)=9.52, p<.001, ηp2=.05, MDeath Qualified = 3.90(SD=1.47), MDeath Always = 
4.71(SD=1.62), MExcludables = 3.27(SD=1.61), MNullifiers = 3.26(SD=1.59), Crime4: 
F(3,518)=21.69, p<.001, ηp2=.11, MDeath Qualified = 5.80(SD=1.19), MDeath Always = 
6.07(SD=1.39), MExcludables = 4.97(SD=1.36), MNullifiers = 4.70(SD=1.55), Crime5: 
F(3,518)=1122, p<.001, ηp2=.06, MDeath Qualified = 5.28(SD=1.43), MDeath Always = 
5.77(SD=1.41), MExcludables = 4.73(SD=1.72), MNullifiers = 4.40(SD=1.67), Crime6: 
F(3,518)=11.88, p<.001, ηp2=.06, MDeath Qualified = 4.80(SD=1.28), MDeath Always = 
5.61(SD=1.05), MExcludables = 4.49(SD=1.2), MNullifiers = 4.17(SD=1.27). 
 157 F(3,518)=56.81, p<.001, ηp2=.25, MDeath Qualified = 5.38(SD=1.05), MDeath Always = 
6.24(SD=0.73), MExcludables = 4.09(SD=1.53), MNullifiers = 3.96(SD=1.39). 
 158 F(3,518)=37.09, p<.001, ηp2=.18, MDeath Qualified = 3.5(SD=1.41), MDeath Always = 
2.58(SD=1.03), MExcludables = 4.8(SD=1.36), MNullifiers = 4.84(SD=1.29). 
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understanding what predicts their decision to answer “yes” or “no” to 
the death qualification questions, and how multiple variables interact 
to influence these decisions. To do this, we conducted a mediation 
analysis159 whereby we tested whether implicit bias, retributive 
philosophy, and mercy philosophy predicted participants’ death 
qualification status.160 Although it would seem logical that participants’ 
death qualification status would be predicted by their core self-reported 
retributive philosophy and mercy philosophy,161 we also found that 
implicit bias scores associating Black-payback predicted retributive 
philosophy (B = 0.44, p=.01), which in turn predicted death 
qualification status.162 That is, participants’ implicit racial biases 
actually led to their death qualification status — the higher the bias, the 
more likely they were to be retributive generally, and the more likely 
they were to be death qualified.  
5. The Press Release Priming Task Did Not Affect Punishment 
Decisions 
Although we hypothesized that including Black-sounding names as 
compared to White-sounding names in the press release would activate 
racial stereotypes, there did not appear to be a priming effect whereby 
the names in the press release affected later judgments. For example, 
there were no significant differences created by the press release 
conditions in responses to the six individual crime questions. This 
result may have been due to several reasons, including the possibility 
that the prime was not strong enough or was just not noticed by study 
participants (just 54.8% accurately recalled two of the names from the 
press release, with no errors, when asked at the end of the study) and 
therefore did not influence participants’ judgments when they were 
later asked to make punishment judgments about crimes unrelated to 
the press release.163 
 
 159 See Dawn Iacobucci, Mediation Analysis and Categorical Variables: The Final 
Frontier, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 582, 589-93 (2012). 
 160 For purposes of this test, we excluded Death Always Jurors and compared Death 
Qualified Jurors to jurors who would be excluded because they would not vote guilty, 
or would not vote for death. However, the results would not have changed even if we 
included Death Always Jurors (zMediation = 5.35, p<.001). 
 161 And, indeed, these philosophies were confirmed as predictors. For Retribution 
philosophy, B = 0.72, p<.001; for Mercy philosophy, B = −0.45, p<.001. 
 162 zMediation = 4.90, p<.001. 
 163 It is also possible that the prime did work, but did not last in such a way that it 
racialized the individual crime judgments that were presented.  
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6. Implicit Race-Retribution Bias Predicted Retribution Theory 
Support 
Results of our regression analyses showed that citizens’ implicit 
Black-retribution biases predicted greater support for retributive 
theories of punishment. In order to investigate the effects of implicit 
bias on jury-eligible citizens’ agreement with retributive and mercy 
theories, we tested two regression models, one focused on what 
predicted participants’ support for retributive theories of justice, and 
one focused on what predicted participants’ support for mercy-based 
theories of justice. In the first model (which we call Model A), we ran 
the following regression: Retributive theory = beta1a × IAT d + beta2a × 
Mercy theory + C. The results of this regression revealed that both 
implicit bias (Black-payback and White-mercy associations) and 
participants’ self-reported agreement with regard to mercy punishment 
theories (the lower the mercy score, the higher the retribution score) 
predicted retributive theory.164 Our second regression analysis, which 
we call Model B, tested the predictors for participants’ self-reported 
agreement with mercy theories: Mercy theory = beta1b × IAT d + beta2 
× Retributive theory + C. This regression found that support for mercy 
theories of punishment were predicted by retributive theory score (the 
lower the retribution score, the higher the mercy score) but not IAT 
score.165 Thus, we found that implicit race-retribution bias indeed 
predicted participants’ support for overall retribution, but not their 
support for mercy.  
Finally, we tested a third regression model to determine the 
predictors of the participants’ average punishment judgments on the six 
crime scenarios. We ran the following regression: Averaged crime score 
= beta1 × Retributive theory + beta2 × Mercy theory + C). The results of 
this regression showed that both the retributive theory (the higher the 
retribution theory score, the harsher the punishment) and the mercy 
theory (the lower the mercy score, the more lenient the punishment) 
predicted crime score.166 Implicit race-retribution bias indirectly 
influenced crime punishments due to its influence on punishment 
theory scores.  
 
 164 Adjusted R2 = .27, F(2,519)=96.45, p<.001, β1a = .09, t=2.39, p<.05, β2a = −.51, 
t=13.57, p<.001. 
 165 Adjusted R2 = .26, F(2,519)=92.68, p<.001, β1b = .01, t=0.38, ns., β2b = −.51, 
t=13.57, p<.001. 
 166 Adjusted R2 = .39, F(2,519)=164.12, p<.001, β1 = .31, t=7.77, p<.001, β2 = −.40, 
t=10.08, p<.001. 
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7. Conservative Americans Held Larger Implicit Race-Retribution 
Biases than Liberal and Neutral Americans 
Political value self-identification was also related to implicit bias 
scores. Those participants who characterized themselves as affiliating 
more with conservative positions held stronger race-retribution implicit 
biases associating Black faces with Payback words and White faces with 
Mercy words, as compared to those participants who characterized 
themselves as neutral or liberal.167  
8. Conservative Citizens Were More Retributive, Punished 
Criminals More Harshly, and Were Less Merciful Than Neutral 
and Liberal Citizens  
Political value self-identification was also related to the other key 
measures in the study. Specifically, we found that conservative citizens 
held stronger retributive punishment philosophies,168 punished 
criminals more harshly,169 and were less likely to support mercy-based 
punishment philosophies,170 as compared to citizens who self-identified 
as either neutral or liberal. 
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF AUTOMATIC RACIALIZED RETRIBUTION FOR 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The results of the empirical study confirm our hypothesized existence 
of a deep and inextricable connection between race and retribution. 
 
 167 F(2,519)=2.88, p=.06, ηp2=.01, MConservative = 0.39 (SD=0.34), MLiberal = 
0.33(SD=0.32), MNeutral=0.28(SD=0.33). 
 168 F(2,519)=23.68, p<.001, ηp2=.08, MLiberal = 4.79(SD=1.32), MConservative = 
5.64(SD=1.10), MNeutral = 5.15(SD=1.30). 
 169 Crime1: F(2,519)=18.50, p <.001, ηp2=.07, MLiberal = 5.56(SD=1.12), MConservative = 
6.19(SD=0.93), MNeutral = 5.90(SD=1.05),  
Crime2: F(2,519)=14.31, p <.001, ηp2=.05, MLiberal = 5.15(SD=1.35), MConservative = 
5.79(SD=1.23), MNeutral = 5.71(SD=1.28),  
Crime3: F(2,519)=18.47, p <.001, ηp2=.06, MLiberal = 3.44(SD=1.5), MConservative = 
4.27(SD=1.45), MNeutral = 4.17(SD=1.57),  
Crime4: F(2,519)=16.61, p <.001, ηp2=.06, MLiberal = 5.30(SD=1.41), MConservative = 
6.04(SD=1.12), MNeutral = 5.61(SD=1.35),  
Crime5: F(2,519)=12.57, p <.001, ηp2=.05, MLiberal = 4.85(SD=1.54), MConservative = 
5.59(SD=1.43), MNeutral = 5.15(SD=1.5),  
Crime6: F(2,519)=11.51, p <.001, ηp2=.04, MLiberal = 4.49(SD=1.29), MConservative = 
5.07(SD=1.19), MNeutral = 4.89(SD = 1.41). 
 170 F(2,519)=24.72, p <.001, ηp2=.09, MLiberal = 4.13(SD=1.41), MConservative = 
3.14(SD=1.43), MNeutral = 3.67(SD=1.59). 
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This racial architecture of retribution has broad consequences, 
including: in lawmaking, where it helps explain how moral panics 
function; in policing, including the use of excessive force against 
unarmed Black citizens; and in sentencing, where it exposes grave, and 
arguably fatal, cracks in the only remaining justification for the 
constitutionality of the death penalty.  
A. The Sole Remaining Justification for the Death Penalty’s 
Constitutionality 
In 2008, Justice John Paul Stevens concluded that “current decisions 
by state legislatures, by the Congress of the United States, and by this 
Court to retain the death penalty as a part of our law . . . rest in part on 
a faulty assumption about the retributive force of the death penalty.”171 
Though retribution is both “the primary rationale for imposing the 
death penalty” and the rationale that “animates much of the remaining 
enthusiasm for the death penalty,” Justice Stevens reiterated that 
because lesser punishments could adequately sate the retributive thirst, 
“the imposition of the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and 
needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any 
discernible social or public purposes.’”172 The Court, in an opinion 
authored by Justice Kennedy, did not go as far as Justice Stevens, but it 
did explain that this core justification for the death penalty is the 
rationale “that most often can contradict the law’s own ends” and that 
its use “risks [the law’s] own sudden descent into brutality, 
transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and 
restraint.”173  
Meanwhile, moving from the core theory of capital punishment to the 
outcomes of actual cases, the presence of racial disparities in death 
sentences and executions continues to define the American experience 
with the death penalty. In McCleskey v. Kemp, decided over thirty years 
ago, the Court, over the dissent of four Justices, affirmed the 
constitutionality of the death penalty. It did so by disparaging the 
results of a sophisticated statistical study showing racial disparities as 
“clearly insufficient to support an inference that any of the 
decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory 
purpose,” showing “at most” a “discrepancy that appears to correlate 
 
 171 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 78 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 172 Id. at 79-80, 86 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)). 
 173 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420, opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 554 
U.S. 945 (2008).  
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with race,” and presenting no “constitutionally significant risk of racial 
bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing process.”174 In the 
intervening decades, a plethora of studies conducted at the state and 
county levels in jurisdictions that span the vast territory of the nation 
have reproduced the finding that racial disparities plague the death 
penalty.175 At the same time, scholars have begun to show that 
procedures central to death penalty trials from jury selection to the 
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to the death 
determination itself are all perfectly suited as sites for implicit racial bias 
to enter into the sentencing determination. In a separate article, 
Devaluing Death, we, along with Dr. Danielle Young, took this 
understanding of the link between race and retribution a step farther by 
showing that Americans tend to associate White faces with concepts 
that connote worth and value and Black faces with words that connote 
expendability and a lack of value.176 Those findings helped to illustrate 
an underlying social reality — the implicit cheapening of Black lives is 
a fact that exists before the emotional responses that drive the increased 
retributive appetite.177 We said there that the implicit devaluing of Black 
lives challenges “the idea that retribution is race-neutral,”178 and posed 
the question of whether “the retributive rationale could be inextricably 
tied to race.”179 Perhaps, we queried, “the race-retribution link” remains 
“culturally programmed.”180  
The results of the current study confirmed our intuitions that race 
and retribution are inextricably tied together. First, we found that 
Americans associate Black faces with retribution and White faces with 
mercy.181 We also found that the strength of the Black-payback 
association on the IAT predicts support for retributive rationales for 
punishment.182 Thus, taken together, our findings suggest that Black 
 
 174 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297, 312-13 (1987).  
 175 See generally BANNER, supra note 59, at 139-42; KENNEDY, supra note 59, at 311-
50 (addressing the ideological gap where race and criminal law intersect, the historical 
causes for a suspicious perception of the criminal justice system by African Americans 
who have also fought to suppress racial injustice and implicit racial targeting for 
particular crimes); OGLETREE & SARAT, supra note 56, at 1 (“[T]here is a long and deep 
connection between this country’s racial politics and its uses of the killings of African-
Americans through lynchings and the death penalty . . . .”). 
 176 Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 32, at 557-64. 
 177 See id. at 573-74. 
 178 Id. at 567. 
 179 Id.  
 180 Id.  
 181 See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 182 See supra note 162 and accompanying text. 
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Americans are associated with concept of retribution in a more direct, 
fundamental way than even our initial theory driven proposal of 
retribution — as we set forth in Part II — would suggest. Emotions such 
as fear and anger likely amplify this connection, but we found that the 
relationship may exist even as a precursor to these emotional processes. 
It is difficult to overstate the importance of these results for the 
constitutionality of the death penalty because there is now 
comprehensive and overlapping evidence that shows not just racially 
disparate outcomes, or the racially unfair aspects of death penalty 
procedures, but also that the sole hanging theoretical thread justifying 
the existence of the death penalty is itself inextricably linked to race. In 
other words, these results fray that remaining thread to a point where it 
can no longer sustain the weight of the enterprise.  
Even if there were some remaining force to the retributive rationale 
for the death penalty generally, our results showing that the process of 
death qualification results in jurors with stronger associations between 
Black faces and the concept of retribution is enough standing alone to 
undermine the perceived race-neutrality of death penalty regimes. We 
have previously found that, with regard to implicit biases related to race 
and the value of human life, Death Qualified Jurors hold these stronger 
raced associations because the process of death qualification excludes 
racial minorities whose associations between Black and valueless are 
weaker.183 Our study results here actually build on this finding by 
demonstrating that the best predictor of citizens’ death qualification 
status may be the strength of their race-retribution implicit bias. That 
is, the strength of the association between Black and retribution actually 
predicts who gets qualified to sit on a capital jury. 
In sum, then, our findings pose fundamental challenges to the 
constitutionality of the death penalty by undermining its retributive 
rationale and exposing the process of death-qualification as one that 
increases, not decreases, racial unfairness.  
B. Explaining Racialized Moral Panics and Harsh Lawmaking 
Remember John DiIulio? He is the professor who, in the 1990s, 
warned of the “[f]atherless, Godless, and jobless” “breed” of juvenile 
“super-predators” who would “kill, rape, maim, without giving it a 
second thought.”184 DiIulio has since apologized for the fear-
 
 183 See Levinson et al., Devaluing Death, supra note 32, at 559-60. 
 184 John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996, 
available at https://www.city-journal.org/html/my-black-crime-problem-and-ours-
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mongering, writing “[t]hank god we were wrong” about the existence 
of superpredators.185 Professor DiIulio joined dozens of other scholars 
in filing an amicus brief that urged the Supreme Court to bar life 
without parole sentences for juvenile offenders.186 That brief noted, 
tellingly: “research that has analyzed the increase in violent crime 
during the early- to mid-1990s and its subsequent decline demonstrates 
that the juvenile superpredator was a myth and the predictions of future 
youth violence were baseless.”187 “Crack babies” are a myth, too.188 
Studies show no significant difference in “long-term health and life 
outcomes between full-term babies exposed to cocaine in-utero and 
those who were not.”189 As we discussed above, these moral panics 
propelled the retributive demand that lead to draconian sentencing 
practices across the country, including a rash of mandatory minimum 
sentencing laws and a severe uptick in sentencing juvenile homicide 
offenders to life without the possibility of parole.190 
Our findings help to explain why these racialized moral panics 
occurred and, more importantly, suggest a few steps that legislatures 
and courts can take that might help prevent such panics in the future. 
Moral panics, like the retributive urge, occur because of fear and anger, 
and the process of dehumanization creates a frenzy that interrupts our 
ability to assess the level of punishment necessary.191 Our findings add 
an important layer of sophistication to this description by suggesting 
that moral panics become racialized not in a direct chain of events, but 
rather in a symbiotic and cyclical way as race shapes the fear, anger, and 
empathy responses that in turn shape retributive demand.  
 
11773.html [https://perma.cc/8CZP-92JE]; DiIulio, Jr., supra note 81; Editorial, Echoes 
of the Superpredator, supra note 7.  
 185 Editorial, Echoes of the Superpredator, supra note 7. 
 186 See Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at vii, Miller 
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (Nos. 10-9647, 10-9646), 2012 WL 174240, at *3. 
 187 Id. at 8.  
 188 Ana Teresa Ortiz & Laura Briggs, The Culture of Poverty, Crack Babies, and 
Welfare Cheats: The Making of the “Healthy White Baby Crisis,” 21 SOC. TEXT 39, 44 
(2003) (“Crack has very little, if any, effect on pregnancies or fetuses.”). 
 189 Katie McDonough, Long-Term Study Debunks Myth of the “Crack Baby,” SALON 
(July 23, 2013, 9:16 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/07/23/longterm_study_ 
debunks_myth_of_the_crack_baby/ [https://perma.cc/SPH6-43Z3] (referring to Laura 
Betancourt et al., Adolescents with and Without Gestational Cocaine Exposure: 
Longitudinal Analysis of Inhibitory Control, Memory and Receptive Language, 
33 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 36 (2011)).  
 190 See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 89. 
 191 See Michael H. Eversman & Jason D. P. Bird, Moral Panic and Social Justice: A 
Guide for Analyzing Social Problems, 62 SOC. WORK 29, 29-30, 33-34 (2017). 
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Given that retributive demand can drive moral panics, and our 
understanding of the direct link between race and retribution, one 
strategy would be to include sunset provisions in new sentencing 
legislation, which would mean that after a set period of time (say, 15-
20 years), the law is voided and the legislature must decide anew 
whether to re-up the punishment or not.192 The benefit of these sunset 
laws is that they ensure that moral panics are not forever built into the 
legal architecture of a society. Once emotions calm down, cooler heads 
adjust the retributive calculus and new legislators simply do not enact 
the same statute (or punishment). Because non-White people are 
disproportionately impacted by carceral moral panics (for example, the 
juvenile super-predator panic), non-White people will also receive the 
most relief from sunset provisions. 
Legislatures could also repeal all harsh mandatory minimum 
sentences,193 which mean that regardless of who the defendant is as a 
person or why the crime occurred, every person convicted of a 
particular crime receives a mandatory minimum sentence. This 
sometimes leads to absurd results. In Duval County, Fla., for example, 
prosecutor Angela Corey sought a mandatory minimum sentence of 
twenty years for Marissa Alexander, a Black woman with no criminal 
record, for firing a warning shot at her abusive husband (the shot did 
not hit anyone).194 However, if laws are indeed crafted in the midst of 
moral panics — which we know was the case with many mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws enacted in the 1980s and ’90s — then the 
legislature’s sense of the necessary level of retribution could differ 
greatly from the community’s post-panic prevailing sentiment. 
Permitting a jury or judge to decide whether the harsh sentence is 
appropriate in a given case works a stop-gap against retributive excess 
that lingers due to the ghosts of long-forgotten racialized moral panics. 
Notably, ending mandatory minimums won’t solve for racialized 
empathy during sentencing hearings, but it at least will mitigate the 
damage of harsher automatic sentences that result from racialized 
panics. 
 
 192 See, e.g., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COAL., 
SMART ON CRIME: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 41 
(2008), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Smart.on. 
Crime.Transition.Report%202008.pdf. 
 193 See John S. Martin Jr., Why Mandatory Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312 (2004). 
 194 See Roland Martin, Opinion, Shame of Mandatory Minimums Shows in Marissa 
Alexander Case, CNN (May 12, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/12/ 
opinion/roland-martin-mandatory-minimums/ [https://perma.cc/7ZJ4-RSG9]. 
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C. Making Sense of Excessive Use of Police Force 
Our results also illuminate how race influences the use of excessive 
force. One of the most vivid examples of excessive use of force is the 
case where a White New York Police Department officer choked Eric 
Garner, an unarmed Black man, to death during a botched attempt to 
arrest Garner for selling loose cigarettes.195 What is striking about 
watching the video of Garner’s death is that Garner is clearly posing no 
threat to the officers, but the officers continue to restrain him even as 
he repeats, “I can’t breathe.”196 This is the forward panic phenomenon, 
discussed above, at work. Black and brown men, people like Eric 
Garner, are disproportionately the recipients of this (often) fear-driven 
excessive force.197 Indeed, a recent study found police officers in New 
York City “more likely to use force against blacks and Hispanics than 
whites, after controlling for other relevant variables.”198 The Las Vegas 
Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) suffered from a similar 
problem — officers too often used force against suspects after a foot 
chase had ended.199 This primarily was a problem in majority non-
White neighborhoods.200  
“You’re an officer, you’re pumping adrenaline, you don’t have time to 
evaluate whether your implicit bias is driving your behavior,” Professor 
Phillip Goff, who consulted with the LVMPD, has said.201 And, yet, this 
is a prime place where the race-retribution link can thrive. How can 
police rules and regulations help eliminate the conscious or 
unconscious felt need for retribution when the suspect is Black? 
 
 195 See Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-
police-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/YQ2C-D5XT]. 
 196 See Annie Karni et al., Two Cops Pulled Off Streets, Staten Island DA Looking into 
Death of Dad of Six After NYPD Cop Put Him in Chokehold During Sidewalk Takedown - 
Exclusive Video, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 19, 2014), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/nyc-crime/staten-island-da-man-death-nypd-chokehold-article-1.1871946 
[https://perma.cc/WAD8-YK8U]. 
 197 See Sarah Zwach, Comment, Disproportionate Use of Deadly Force on Unarmed 
Minority Males: How Gender and Racial Perceptions Can Be Remedied, 30 WIS. J.L., 
GENDER & SOC’Y 185, 188-92 (2015). 
 198 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 199 See Marcus Woo, How Science is Helping America Tackle Police Racism, WIRED 
(Jan. 21, 2015, 6:45 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/01/implicit-bias-police-racism-
science/ [https://perma.cc/F6KE-DH8P].  
 200 See id. 
 201 Chris Mooney, The Science of Why Cops Shoot Young Black Men, MOTHER JONES 
(Dec. 1, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2014/12/science-of-racism-prejudice [https://perma.cc/B49U-7A4].  
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One possible way to address the problem of excessive use of force is 
a proposed rule, as scholars have suggested, whereby an officer who 
chased the suspect cannot be the person to put handcuffs on the suspect 
once the suspect is apprehended.202 The LVMPD implemented such a 
new rule and use of force claims are down.203 However, because police 
use of excessive force often takes place in a matter of seconds, it may be 
difficult to eliminate racial bias by focusing exclusively on the 
encounter itself. There are thus two other possibilities. The first is to 
reduce baseline levels of policing, which would have the effect of 
limiting the number of police-civilian interactions that could potentially 
result in the use of excessive force, particularly when non-White 
neighborhoods are disproportionately policed.204 The second is for 
police departments to train officers not to focus on low-level infractions 
(e.g., minor traffic infraction or marijuana possession) that so often lead 
to police-civilian encounters where excessive force ultimately occurs. 
CONCLUSION 
Retribution has long been at the core of American criminal justice. 
Yet, the legal and psychological scholarship on how racial bias 
continues to operate in the criminal justice system, which has focused 
extensively on procedural aspects and sentencing outcomes, is devoid 
of a comprehensive examination of how the driving spirit of 
punishment itself interacts with racial bias. This Article filled the gap in 
two ways: 
First, the Article deconstructed our hypothesis that race and 
retribution are inexorably intertwined in the minds of Americans.205 It 
demonstrated how history, as well as the emotional responses such as 
fear, anger and lack of empathy amplify the felt need for retribution, 
and do so in a predictably racialized way.206 This reconstruction of the 
psychological nuts and bolts of the link between race and retribution 
provides us with a window into how racialized moral panics such as the 
superpredator scare and the crack-baby phenomenon of the 1990s take 
hold and translate into harsh sentencing practices. These sentencing 
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practices, in turn, contribute to the racial disparities that define the 
nation’s experience with mass incarceration. 
Second, we set out to test our hypothesis empirically.207 To that end, 
we revealed the results of an experimental study of over 500 jury-
eligible citizens. In the study, we found that jury-eligible citizens 
implicitly associate White Americans with words that connote a need 
for “mercy” and Black Americans with words that connote a need for 
“retribution,” that death-qualified jurors hold stronger implicit biases 
than do jury-eligible citizens generally, and that implicit racial bias 
predicted overall support for retribution theory.208 These findings 
powerfully demonstrate that the core penological theory driving 
modern criminal justice has itself become a hopelessly raced concept. 
The study results we presented have wide-ranging implications for 
legislative enactments, constitutional challenges to harsh punishment 
practices, and for the reduction of excessive force against civilians in 
the context of policing.209 Future research is warranted on how race and 
retribution interact during the use emotional primes (e.g., fear, anger) 
in particular factual scenarios. These results could add an additional 
layer of sophistication to the current study. Moreover, researchers 
might consider how these findings around race and retributive excess 
map onto other marginalized groups in the criminal justice process. 
Finally, our results in the criminal justice context have implications 
beyond criminal law theory: for example, the racialized retributive urge 
we discussed could help explain the relationship between race and 
punitive damage awards in the context of torts actions. 
 
 207 See supra Parts II.A, II.B. 
 208 See supra Part III.B. 
 209 See supra Part IV. 
